EDB INTEGRATION
BAROMETER – 2016
(FIFTH WAVE OF THE SURVEY)
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(Fifth Wave of the Survey)

Report 40

Eurasian Development Bank

Centre for Integration Studies
Saint Petersburg
2016
In April–June 2016, the Eurasian Development Bank’s Centre for Integration Studies together with its international research partner Eurasian Monitor conducted the fifth wave of measurements of the sentiment of the countries of the post-Soviet space as part of the EDB Integration Barometer project. This research is focused on the integration orientations of the citizens of countries of the CIS region. The fifth wave of the project includes nationwide surveys in seven countries of the CIS region: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and Tajikistan. In all, 8,500 people were surveyed (at least 1,000 people in each country, according to a representative national sampling).

During the course of our research, we found confirmation of basic patterns discovered from the results of the surveys conducted in the previous monitoring waves, and in certain countries, we observed a definite change in public opinion relating to integration preferences.

Electronic version of the report is available on the Eurasian Development Bank’s website at:
http://eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/integration_barometer/

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

**CIS** — Commonwealth of Independent States  
**CSTO** — Collective Security Treaty Organization  
**CU** — Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia  
**EAEU** — Eurasian Economic Union  
**EDB** — Eurasian Development Bank  
**EM** — International Research Agency Eurasian Monitor  
**EU** — European Union  
**pp** — Percentage point — a unit of difference in values measured as percentages  
**SES** — Single Economic Space, consisting of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia  
**USA** — United States of America  
**USSR** — Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Analytical summary

In April–June 2016, The EDB Centre for Integration Studies and the International Research Agency Eurasian Monitor jointly implemented the fifth wave of the EDB Integration Barometer. The analytical summary briefly presents some of the research results, which are shown in greater detail in the main section of this report.

Explanation of methodology

We remind the reader that the EDB Integration Barometer project each year monitors the foreign economic, the sociocultural, and other integration preferences of citizens of the countries of the post-Soviet space. The concept of an individual’s “integration preference” is interpreted through the simpler concept of “attraction to a country.” Attraction is measured across three dimensions: political, economic, and sociocultural. Each of these dimensions, in turn, is revealed through a respondent’s specific interest (respectively in the areas of politics, economics, and sociocultural interaction) and an appropriate question. Each survey form contains roughly 20 questions. The specified list of questions and answers makes it possible to form three groups of conclusions with respect to the data for each question: integration preferences for post-Soviet states (preference for CIS countries)*, integration preference outside this space (preference for the European Union or “other countries”, i.e. “the rest of the world”), and the level of public opinion in favour of a country’s own autonomous development (no “attractive” countries).

The general purpose of the research is to monitor and study the integration preferences of the citizens of the countries of the CIS region. In 2012 (first wave), 11 countries (10 CIS countries and Georgia) participated in the project. In 2013, a twelfth country — Turkmenistan — joined the project. In 2015, the research was performed in nine countries of the post-Soviet space. In 2016 (fifth wave), the research was conducted in seven countries: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and Tajikistan**. In all, 8,500 people were surveyed in 2016 (not less than 1,000 people in each country).

* In this report, “post-Soviet space” means the 12 former republics of the USSR that originally belonged to the CIS. The term “CIS region” is used synonymously.

** More detailed information on all five waves of the EDB Integration Barometer, including data sets, presentations, and other materials, is available on the EDB’s website at: http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/integration_barometer/
Public support for Eurasian integration

Public attitudes in the seven countries surveyed toward the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) may be characterized as positive (see Figure A). With the exception of Armenia, the share of positive opinions in EAEU member states toward Eurasian integration in 2016 was greater than 60%, ranging from 63% in Belarus to 81% in Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, Belarus saw a rise in public support for participation in the EAEU over the year from 60% to 63%, while this indicator is trending downward in the Union’s remaining member states. For example, over the past year support in Kazakhstan for participation in the EAEU fell from 80% to 74%, in Kyrgyzstan from 86% to 81%.

The most noticeable declines in public support for participation in the Eurasian Economic Union were seen in Russia (from 78% to 69%) and Armenia (from 56% to 46%). In nearly all of these cases, support for Eurasian integration dropped due to an increase in the number of “indifferent” assessments — though, in Armenia, it was also due to a rise in opinions assessments (by 5 pp).

In Tajikistan, public support for the possible accession to the EAEU in 2016 amounted to 68% (in 2015, 72%). In Moldova, 53% of citizens support a potential accession to the EAEU, just as in 2015. However, over the year, the percentage of “indifferent” persons grew (by 9 pp), while negative opinions dropped slightly.

In most countries (Kyrgyzstan is an exception), those who are better off in terms of economic well-being are more likely to have a positive attitude toward the Union than the less well off (see Table 6.5, p. 89). We may also note that low-income groups of citizens are relatively more likely than high-income earners to state their indifference or even negative attitude toward the EAEU. This conclusion does not apply to Russia, where there is virtually no differentiation in attitudes toward the Union in groups with different economic positions.

As part of the 2016 survey, people in EAEU member states were asked about their attitude toward the potential introduction of a common currency, the authorization of citizens’ free movement within the EAEU, an expansion of the Union, the conclusion of an agreement on free trade and investments between the EAEU and the EU, and the creation of a common television broadcasting company for EAEU member states. The data reveal that in all EAEU member states and for nearly all of the proposed options, most (more than half) citizens responded positively (except for the question about introducing a common currency in Armenia and Belarus, where opinions were divided). Two options received large support in all of the union countries: “authorization of EAEU member states’ citizens’ free movement within the Union with the opportunity to take up residence, work, study, and conduct business anywhere in EAEU countries...” and “the conclusion of an agreement on free trade and investments between EAEU countries and the European Union.”

In Belarus, across all of the indicated questions, high-income earners voted “For” more often than low-income earners. In Russia and Armenia, a difference between high-income and low-income earners is only seen in the questions about a common currency and a free trade agreement between EAEU countries and the EU. Moreover, in Russia,
high-income earners were supportive more often than low-income earners for both measures. In Armenia, citizens with low incomes were more likely to welcome the introduction of a common currency. In Kyrgyzstan, the relatively better off are more likely to be in favour of free movement of citizens of EAEU member states within the Union, while in Kazakhstan, the opposite is true: low-income earners are more supportive of this measure (see Table 6.6, p. 90).
Public conceptions regarding relations between the countries of the CIS region in the coming five years are also not uniform (see Figure 1.3, p. 27). **In all EAEU member states, the year brought a slight decline in the share of respondents who believe that, in the coming five years, the countries of the CIS region will converge.** This trend was most notable in the public opinion of Armenia (a decrease from 26% to 14%) and Kyrgyzstan (from 70% to 60%). However, in Kyrgyzstan, the percentage of “optimists” is higher than that of “pessimists”, just as it is in Tajikistan. The past year also reveals a statistically significant change in the growth of optimistic opinions regarding this question in Moldova (from 29% to 38%).

Moreover, in Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the opinion that the countries will converge is expressed more often by high-income earners than by low-income earners. At the same time, in Belarus, Russia, and Moldova, opinions do not consistently depend on respondents’ economic positions (based on an analysis of two parameters — economic position and consumer status).

### Table A.

Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia have joined together in the Eurasian Economic Union and are discussing further joint actions. What is your attitude toward each of the following potential actions? Are you “For” or “Against”... (% of respective responses in each country)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are you “For” or “Against”...</th>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Belarus</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... the introduction of a common currency in the EAEU countries?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s hard to say</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the creation of a common television broadcasting company for EAEU member states?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s hard to say</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the authorization of EAEU member states’ citizens’ free movement within the Union with the opportunity to take up residence, work, study, and conduct business anywhere in EAEU countries?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s hard to say</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the expansion of the EAEU through other countries’ accession to the Union?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s hard to say</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the conclusion of an agreement on free trade and investments between EAEU countries and the European Union?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s hard to say</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Perceptions of the friendliness/unfriendliness of other countries

The first indicator of countries' political closeness/distance is the citizens' conceptions regarding which states are friendly or unfriendly. In 2016, an average of 82% of the population of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and Tajikistan believe their neighbouring countries in the CIS region are friendly. The lowest levels of trust for post-Soviet countries are seen in Moldova (65%, though in 2015 this figure was 58%) and Armenia (this figure decreased from 87% to 72% over the year). Thus, while the trend toward perceiving countries of the CIS region as less friendly, which began two years ago, has turned somewhat in Moldova, Armenia's indicator has dropped to its lowest value in the five years of observations (see Figure 2.1, p. 29).

Within the CIS region, Russia remains the most friendly country, according to public opinion in the seven surveyed countries. As before, Russia's highest scores as a friendly country are recorded in Kyrgyzstan (89%), Tajikistan (82%, though this is an 8 pp drop relative to last year), Belarus (82%), and Kazakhstan (81%). However, in the past year, Armenia experienced a noticeable decline in the perception of Russia as a friendly country: from 86% in 2015 to 69% in 2016 (see Figure 2.2, p. 31).

For their part, Russians believe the most friendly countries to be Belarus (65%), Kazakhstan (51%), China (41%), and Armenia (35%). Curiously, relative to the previous year, Russia registered a doubling of the perception that Ukraine (8%) and Georgia (16%) are friendly countries (this is the highest result since 2012).

The question regarding the “unfriendliness” of countries is no less informative for understanding the political tension between states. The distribution of responses here proves to have shifted in the same direction as the distribution of responses regarding friendly countries — toward neighbouring countries within the CIS region.

According to the survey, the most significant responses regarding the presence of unfriendly countries among the countries of the CIS region are seen in Armenia (97% of respondents have such an opinion of Azerbaijan – the highest figure seen over the five years of observations), Kyrgyzstan (64% of respondents identified Uzbekistan) and Russia (63% of respondents, with 57% indicating Ukraine). Kazakhstan has also experienced a noticeable rise in this indicator (by 13 pp), which reached 34% in 2016. Moreover, 23% of respondents indicate Ukraine as an unfriendly country in the CIS region (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4, pp. 33–34).

The most striking income-dependent differences in the perception of specific unfriendly countries, according to the research, are observed in Kazakhstan (see Table 6.1, p. 85). In general, representatives of high-income groups quite rarely call countries unfriendly (with the exception of China). At the same time, the low-income citizens of Kazakhstan more actively identify “unfriendly countries”, e.g. Ukraine (47%), United States (37%), and Turkey (17%).

A lack of a feeling of friendliness from other countries is more often declared among the low-income segments of the population — in a number of countries, these differences are more noticeable (Armenia, Belarus, Russia, Tajikistan) than in others (Moldova). Presumably, this is linked to the low-income groups' reduced social status and,
consequently, to a negative attitude toward other entities (in particular, other countries). These patterns persist in groups identified on the basis of consumer status.

**Economic-attraction vectors**

The economic attractiveness of any country is a powerful stimulus for public support for integration and cooperation with that country. We will point out the distinctive features of the attractiveness of groups of countries as manufacturers of goods, sources of foreign capital, partners in scientific and technological cooperation, and potential employers. We will also cite data regarding the countries for which one of the three geopolitical vectors (CIS countries, EU countries, or “the rest of the world”) is preferred over the others.

**Goods** produced in CIS countries enjoy the greatest popularity in the countries of Central Asia: Tajikistan (72%) and Kazakhstan (62%). In Kyrgyzstan, the percentage of residents who prefer goods from CIS countries is rather high (56%), but, unlike in the countries mentioned above, it does not represent an overwhelming majority. However, **Kyrgyzstan has seen a sharp rise in their interest in buying goods from CIS countries:** from 34% in 2015 to 56% in 2016 (see Figure 3.1, p. 43).

A trend toward increasing attractiveness of goods from European Union countries is seen in every country participating in the research, except Tajikistan. Among the sampled countries, the population of Moldova (56%) is most loyal to products imported from EU countries. The preferences of respondents from Kyrgyzstan (62%) are somewhat more oriented toward goods from the “rest of the world.”

**The residents of Russia and Belarus are most similar in their consumer preferences:** both countries had approximately the same level of preference for goods imported from the European Union and the “rest of the world” (the percentage of respondents choosing the countries in these blocs varies from 44% in Russia to 51% in Belarus). However, the population of Belarus is slightly more oriented toward buying products produced in CIS countries. Thus, in Belarus, 33% of respondents prefer Russian goods, and in Russia 25% of respondents prefer Belarusian goods (in both cases, slightly greater preference was given to goods from Germany). Armenia expresses loyalty to goods imported from CIS countries (40%) and EU countries (48%).

**Based on the average indicators for 2014–2016, Russia, Germany, and Turkey are most often the top three goods-producing countries preferred by other countries.** Other countries mentioned in the top three include Japan, China, the United States, Belarus, France, and some other EU countries.

Residents of Moldova (42%), Russia (35%), and Armenia (30%) are most oriented toward their domestic (national) markets; the populations of Tajikistan (3%) and Kyrgyzstan (8%) are the least oriented toward their domestic markets.

According to public opinion in the seven surveyed countries, an **inflow of foreign capital** is most desirable from the geographically close countries of the CIS region and “the rest of the world” (46% for each). The average figure for public confidence in capital from European Union countries is somewhat lower at 40% (see Figure 3.3, p. 47).
Despite a slight decline, the populations of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan demonstrate the greatest interest in an inflow of capital (investments, business) from CIS countries in comparison with other countries. Nevertheless, the past year saw a significant reduction in the percentage of the population in support of an inflow of capital from CIS countries into Tajikistan (from 75% to 64%, which is roughly equal to the level in 2013) and into Kyrgyzstan (from 64% to 54%). The population of Moldova prefers (57%) investments and business from European Union countries. In 2016, none of the surveyed countries expresses powerful preferences for an inflow of capital from “the rest of the world.”

Russia (40%) and Kazakhstan (34%) are most inclined to “close” their economies to foreign capital. However, a large portion of those surveyed in the seven countries participating in the 2016 research support a policy of being economically “open” to foreign capital. The ranking of the most desirable investor countries includes Russia, Germany, United States, China, and Japan.

When determining the preferred partners in science and technology, we discovered that “the rest of the world” leads (54%), while 44% of respondents express interest in CIS countries and 40% in countries of the European Union (see Figure 3.5, p. 50). Among all of the countries, the orientation toward partnership in science and technology is highest for Russia, which an average of 40% of respondents mention, followed by Germany (32%) and Japan (31%).
The opportunity to cooperate in scientific and technological matters with countries of the CIS bloc is most attractive to the residents of Tajikistan (66%), whereas in Kyrgyzstan, the past year saw the interest in scientific and technological cooperation with CIS countries drop from 58% to 42%.

Based on the 2016 survey, scientific and technological cooperation with European Union countries is not a priority for any of the participating countries. At the same time, joint research and exchanging workers, technologies, and scientific ideas with “the rest of the world” is preferred in all of the surveyed countries, except Moldova and Kazakhstan.

In Tajikistan the percentage of the population in support of scientific and technological cooperation with “the rest of the world” increases from 31% to 50%. A positive trend can also be seen in Kyrgyzstan, where the share of the population that is similarly disposed grew from 50% to 61%.

When it comes to labour migration, the surveyed countries prefer neighbouring CIS countries (28% of preferences), while giving European Union countries and “the rest of the world” 22% and 20% of preferences, respectively (see Figures 3.9 and 3.10, pp. 55–56). On average over all of the sampled countries, the most popular destinations for potential migrant workers are Russia (27%), Germany (12%), and the United States (10%). As concerns differences in preferences across income groups, the wealthy segments of the population manifest a desire to work in the United States and Germany more often than low-income earners. This is evident in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Russia. But in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, there are no differences between income groups.
Moreover, planning to seek temporary employment abroad is not a priority among the populations of the surveyed countries: the cumulative indicator for those who had difficulty responding or selected the “None” option has remained quite high over all of the waves of the EDB Integration Barometer, and in 2016 it was 44% on average across all of the countries.

The same applies to the question of moving to another country for permanent residence: in all countries, except Moldova, Armenia, and Tajikistan, more than 60% of the population does not intend to change their place of residence (see Figure 3.11, p. 58). With respect to the question of moving to another country for permanent residence, we do not detect serious differences between income groups or general trends (except for certain directions of movement in specific countries). This also applies to the “None” option. In Armenia, Moldova, Russia, and Tajikistan, this option is chosen more often by low-income groups than high-income groups, but in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the situation is reversed.

Sociocultural attractions

One of the important indicators of the sociocultural closeness of countries is the presence of real communication with relatives, friends, and colleagues located in other countries. On average, across the seven countries in question, 60% of the surveyed population indicate that they maintain such personal ties with people who live in the countries of the post-Soviet space (recall that in 2015 this figure was 57% for nine countries) (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4, pp. 63–64). This is evidence of the presence of significant social integration in the CIS region, which is an important precondition for the progress of Eurasian integration.

Also, we should highlight rising interest in Kazakhstan in getting the education within the post-Soviet space (32%, a 6 pp yearly growth during the last two years). But the highest level of educational interest in the CIS countries cluster is seen in Tajikistan (56%; see Figure 4.7, p. 68). On average across the countries, roughly one third of the population is not considering any international education option (neither for themselves or their children). The highest percentages of educational “autonomists” are found in Russia (70%) and Belarus (58%). Most often, this kind of attitude is demonstrated by the low-income segments of the population.

Finally, considering all three factors — political, economic, and sociocultural — for a relative majority of countries participating in the 2016 survey, the top attraction vector is directed toward the post-Soviet space, with the political factor being key to this alignment. Based on the 2016 survey, the populations Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are predominantly oriented toward the post-Soviet space (see Figure 5.1, p. 80). Despite the relative stability of the geopolitical positioning of this group of countries in the past two years, we should point out the unstable attitudes in Armenia and Russia: Armenia is increasingly becoming “multi-vectored”, while Russia, conversely, has recently become more oriented toward the CIS region. An analysis of how integration attitudes vary relative to the respondents’ different income levels reveals that, without exception, we cannot discern any general patterns characteristic of all surveyed countries.
Introduction

The global tendencies of recent years, which have been characterized by elevated political turbulence and economic instability, are, among other things, a serious test of the durability of many existing interstate organizations and unions and of new integration projects that are still proving their right to exist.

On the one hand, it is becoming obvious that specific states cannot be developed without taking into consideration the interests and development prospects of neighbouring countries and regions and without coordinating these interests and prospects. States are becoming increasingly interdependent, and they constantly enter into various alliances and unions, engage in planned cooperation, and strive to expand the area of influence of the norms and standards of economic, political, and cultural life they find acceptable. By entering into large political bodies, they protect themselves from the potential expansion of another major body.

On the other hand, given the difficult economic situation of the prolonged global economic crisis and the revision of the financial and economic systems, some national elites see in unions excessive risks and costs associated with “allied” obligations. As a result, some countries begin efforts to escape the crisis alone, without taking on these obligations of integration.

In all of these processes, both integration and disintegration, public opinion is growing ever more important. Despite its controllability, public sentiment at times leads to outcomes entirely unexpected by some of these elites (for example, consider the striking example of Brexit 2016). Therefore, constant monitoring of public sentiment, studying citizens’ attitudes toward various types of unions and organizations, as well as investigating the factors that influence these attitudes will become the most important element of integration policy. The recent examples of an abrupt deterioration in the relations between certain countries demonstrate that even serious political agreements and national economic interdependence will not save them from disintegration in case of a breakdown in humanitarian (cultural) connections and given informational and ideological confrontations.

Based on what has been stated, it is clearly important that integration policy implement accompanying projects, such as the EDB Integration Barometer, which has been realized through the joint efforts of the EDB Centre for Integration Studies and the International Research Agency Eurasian Monitor since 2012. This report presents the main results of the fifth wave of the EDB Integration Barometer, which was conducted in April–June 2016.
Research methodology

Research purpose, object, subject, and method

The EDB Integration Barometer’s research methodology (including the purpose, object, subject, and operationalization of the basic concepts) is described in detail in the reports on the previous waves of the project. The project’s fifth wave, which is presented in this report, fully reproduces the methodology of the previous waves in accordance with the general idea of monitoring integration attitudes.

Recall that we have interpreted an individual’s “integration preference” through the simpler concept of “attraction to a country.” This criterion — “attraction” — on the level of the individual includes interest, sympathy, connections (through work, relatives, etc.), and willingness to work together, while on the level of a country’s entire population it reflects the distribution of attraction vectors with respect to other countries, i.e. latent public support for cooperation and integration, as expressed in the aggregate public sentiment.

In order to fully uncover the research subject, the decision was made to measure attraction to a country across three dimensions: political, economic, and sociocultural. Each of these dimensions, in turn, is revealed through a specific interest (in the areas of politics, economics, and sociocultural interaction, respectively). Each survey question reflects a relevant indication of the respondent’s political, economic, or sociocultural distance from various countries.

The questionnaire’s main section includes the following questions/indicators (see Table 1). Some are required to be included in the national surveys, while others are desirable to be included.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number in the questionnaire</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Question status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sociocultural interaction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In your opinion, which of the countries listed on the form are friends to our country (i.e. countries we can rely on for help in an hour of need)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| T2                          | Political                                 | Optional        |
|                             | Economic                                  |                 |
|                             | Sociocultural interaction                 |                 |
|                             | And which of the countries, in your opinion, are unfriendly to our country (i.e. countries with which our relations are full of controversy or that threaten our country)? |

Table 1. List of the main questions in the EDB Integration Barometer questionnaire

1 For example, see the Analytical Report on the fourth Wave of the EDB Integration Barometer at http://www.eabr.org/general/scripts/stat.php?doc=/general/upload/EDB_Centre_Analytical_Report_33_Full_Rus.pdf
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T3 Regarding military and political aid (weapons, military contingent, political support at the international level, etc.), to which of these countries would our country render such aid?</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T4 Regarding military and political aid (weapons, military contingent, political support at the international level, etc.), from which of these countries would our country accept such aid?</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T5 Which of the listed countries have you visited in the last 5 years for personal, business, or tourism purposes?</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T6 In which of the listed countries do you have relatives, close friends, and colleagues with whom you maintain constant communication (in person, by mail, phone, etc.)?</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T7 For which of the listed countries would you say you have an interest in their history, culture, and natural geography?</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T8 Please indicate which of the listed countries you would like to travel to for vacation or tourism purposes.</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T9 Please indicate which of the listed countries you would like to travel to for studies. ONLY ASKED OF RESPONDENTS YOUNGER THAN 35 YEARS OLD. Or: Which of the listed countries would you like to send your children to for studies? ONLY ASKED OF RESPONDENTS 35 YEARS AND OLDER</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T10 In which countries (of those listed on the form) would you like to temporarily work if you had the opportunity?</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T11 Which of the listed countries would you like to move to for permanent residence if the opportunity presented itself?</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T12 In your opinion, from which countries do we need to invite into our country more actors, writers, and artists, and buy and translate books, movies, musical productions, and other cultural works?</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T13 Tourists arriving from which countries would be desirable in our country?</td>
<td>Optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T14 From which countries would it have been desirable if temporary and permanent workers, students, and specialists came into our country for work and studies?</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T15 From which countries would it be desirable for our country to receive capital, investments and an influx of companies, entrepreneurs, and businessmen to set up their firms among us?</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T16 With which countries would it be beneficial to our government and business to engage in scientific and technological cooperation, conduct joint research, and exchange developments, technologies, and scientific ideas?</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T17 Which countries’ products do you prefer to buy and trust the most?</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Questions T1–T17 are constructed using a single principle: in his or her answer, a respondent must choose the countries from the given country list that correspond to the criteria specified in the question. The set of possible answers is given in Table 2.

As before, the methodological basis for measuring the integration preferences of the public was mass surveys of citizens in the countries of the post-Soviet space, according to a representative national sampling. In other words, the integration preferences were measured through the declarations (statements, public attitudes) of survey participants (respondents).

The fifth wave of the EDB Integration Barometer survey was conducted as part of Eurasian Monitor’s 25th survey tour (EM-25). This time, the surveys were only conducted...
The questionnaire almost entirely matched that of the previous waves. The only innovation was a question about potential integration actions within the EAEU, which was included in the surveys given to the five countries that belong to the EAEU (see paragraph 1.2 for details).

The procedures for organizing and conducting the surveys (field stage) are described in Appendix 1.

**Structure of the analytical report**

The structure of the analytical report corresponds to the topical division of the research instrumentation — the three main sections describe integration preferences for the political, economic, and sociocultural spheres (sections 2–4), respectively. Additionally, separate sections of the report have traditionally been dedicated to building aggregate indicators (indices) that characterize the integration preferences of residents of the Eurasian space (section 5). Moreover, the report begins with a description of attitudes toward interstate alliances and unions (EAEU) in the Eurasian space (section 1).

Pursuant to the research requirements specifications, the report also presents the results of an analysis of integration preferences broken down by groups of respondents with different self-assessments of wealth and consumer status (section 6).

Frequency distributions of respondents’ answers to the questions in the question block are available on the EDB’s website (see the link in the Analytical summary).
1. Attitude toward interstate alliances, unions, and associations in the eurasian space

The prospects for increased or diminished public support for integration processes in the post-soviet space undoubtedly depend on the citizens’ attitudes toward a large number of widely varying aspects of interaction and interstate cooperation. Moreover, the integration (reintegration) of countries — the components of which are sociocultural convergence, intensification of economic interaction, and military and political cooperation — is in the official, legal, and public arena expressed in the conclusion of agreements to unite the countries in various unions and alliances that bind these countries by mutual obligations. Therefore, citizens’ attitudes toward international integration may be distilled to their attitudes toward interstate alliances, unions, and associations.

In order to determine the base of support for integration organizations and possibly forecast the public’s reaction to their creation, including potential behaviour at public referendums on this topic, the EDB Integration Barometer’s standard questionnaire includes several “direct” questions about attitudes toward international alliances.

1.1. Attitude toward economic unions in the post-Soviet space

To gauge the public’s attitudes in the participating countries with respect to economic unions in the post-Soviet space (Customs Union, Eurasian Economic Space, EAEU), a corresponding direct question was added to the monitoring tool. In 2012–2014, attitudes toward the Customs Union were measured. Beginning in 2015, the question has been about attitudes toward the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The wording of the questions varied depending on whether the country belonged to the organization: in member states, the question asked about attitudes toward the organization, while in other countries (in 2016, these were Tajikistan and Moldova), the question was about the desirability of joining the EAEU. The distribution of responses to this survey question is depicted in the charts in Figure 1.1.

Overall, public opinion toward the EAEU in the seven countries may be characterized as positive. As in previous years, among EAEU member states, more than 60% of opinions were positive: from 63% in Belarus to 81% in Kyrgyzstan. Armenia was somewhat of an exception. Fewer than half (46%) the respondents there expressed positive attitudes toward the EAEU, though just one year ago this figure was 10 pp higher. At the same time, the percentage of respondents reporting negative opinions of the Union also grew. Besides in Armenia, a statistically significant drop in this figure over the last year was recorded in Russia. However, the share of proponents of the Union remains an absolute majority of the population, though it did shrink from 78% in 2015 to 69% in 2016.

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2 Georgia and Ukraine did not participate in the 2016 survey. The 2015 data are presented for these countries.
And in other EAEU member states (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), this figure did not increase either; in fact, a reduction, albeit small (by 5–6 pp), was recorded. Only in Belarus can we say that public opinion regarding this question is stable.

Tajikistan typically has favourable opinions for this indicator. Its population is oriented toward economic interaction with the countries of the CIS region, above all with Russia.

As for Moldova, we see a consistent percentage of positive opinions with a simultaneous

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries who have signed the European Union Association Agreement</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
rise in the share of “indifferent” responses thanks to a slight reduction in the negative opinions. Considering the various indicators as a whole, we may conjecture that Moldova is somewhat weary of the disputes between the two union orientations (EU vs. EAEU), and there is an emerging trend toward some “third option”: independent development.

Figure 1.2. shows the dynamics of attitudes toward economic unions in the post-Soviet space, expressed on a different scale (a five-point scale was used in the responses to the question)\(^3\). We can see that in 2016 the level of positive attitudes toward such unions diminished in all countries where the survey was conducted, except Belarus and Moldova. However, we must emphasize that this decline is small. In none of the seven countries, besides Armenia, is the indicator at a low when compared with the data from the other

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\(^3\) When creating an index of attitudes toward the EAEU, the ordinal scale from “absolutely negative” to “absolutely positive” (five gradations) was replaced with a conventional interval from 1 to 5.
years of measurement. In other words, in most of the countries, the measurements are within the “margin of error.”

In Armenia, attitudes have become relatively less positive. This trend has been seen consistently since 2014. As compared with the first wave in 2012, this figure has fallen 0.7 pp (from 4.1 to 3.4), which is statistically significant. Judging by expert opinions, public sentiment dynamics have been influenced primarily by the escalation of the Armenian–Azerbaijan conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh and dissatisfaction with the position taken by Russia and other countries of the EAEU and CSTO with respect to this matter.

1.2. Attitude toward the potential development of the EAEU

The 2016 survey of the population of EAEU member states asked about attitudes toward a future potential development of the Union: introduction of a common currency, creation of a common television broadcasting company, authorization of citizens’ free movement, expansion of the Union, and conclusion of an agreement on free trade and investments between the EAEU and the EU. The distribution of the respondents’ answers is given in Table 1.1.

An analysis of the data shows that in all EAEU member states, the majority of citizens (more than half) responded positively to nearly all of the proposed options for developing the Union. The only exception was the indicator of attitudes toward the introduction of a common currency. In two of the five countries (Armenia and Belarus), neither of the alternative answers was chosen by a majority of respondents. Moreover, in both Kazakhstan and Russia, the positive attitude toward introducing a common currency does not dominate obviously (58% in Kazakhstan and 54% in the Russian Federation). Only Kyrgyzstan stands out, where more than two-thirds of respondents “vote in favour” of a common currency.

Attitudes toward a common currency were measured in the survey of four EAEU member states in 2015, though the question was worded somewhat differently (“Does the Union need... a common currency?”). A year ago, Armenia was the only country where more than half of the respondents (55%) selected “Probably.” Thus, in this country, we can see a negative dynamic with respect to the question of a common currency. In contrast, the trend in three other countries is rather positive. In Kazakhstan and Russia, “Yes”, though not dominating, was chosen by a majority (but was not a year ago). Opinions also improved in Belarus: in 2015, the share of “Probably not” responses prevailed over the positive responses (46% vs. 34%), whereas today the supporters of a common currency, on the contrary, outnumber those who are opposed.

Of all five possible options for future actions by EAEU member states, two receive the greatest support in all of the countries: authorization of EAEU member states’ citizens’ free movement within the Union with the opportunity to take up residence, work, study, and conduct business anywhere in EAEU countries and conclusion of an agreement on free trade and investments between EAEU countries and the European Union. In other words, the public is most supportive of the freedom to move and conduct business (i.e., in the area of trade and investments) both within the Union and between countries of the EAEU and the EU.
Residents of Kyrgyzstan actively speak out in favour of *freedom to move and conduct business*, which is clearly connected to the country’s excess labour force and the desire to utilize this oversupply in other locations.

Most of the population in all five countries have a generally favourable perception of *creating a common television broadcasting company* (from 52% who are “For” in Armenia to 72% in Kyrgyzstan). Finally, *expansion of the EAEU through other countries’ accession* also receives the approval of a majority in all member states.

Thus, the citizens’ positions related to future joint actions by the EAEU member states may generally be considered to be quite positive. The proposed actions are supported by a majority of the populations of all of the countries (except for the introduction of a common currency in Armenia and Belarus, where opinions are split). This does not diminish the urgency of aligning information policies aimed at shaping public opinion in EAEU member states through informing the public of the essence, significance, and advantages of both the Union itself and the specific areas for its further development.
The subject of the citizens’ attitudes toward economic unions is relevant not only for the post-Soviet space: a number of similar questions are asked as part of Eurobarometer research. Table 1.2. above presents the results of the surveys of citizens in EU countries, which characterize their attitudes toward a common currency; expansion of the EU in the future; authorization of EU countries’ citizens’ free movement within the Union with the opportunity to take up residence, work, study, and conduct business anywhere in EU countries; and conclusion of an agreement on free trade and investments between EU countries and the United States (2012–2015).

By comparing the presented Eurobarometer data with the data from the survey of citizens of EAEU member states, we can say they have a certain similarity regarding the common currency. On average across the countries participating in the EDB Integration Barometer 2016, attitudes toward introducing a common currency also prevail in the EU (an average of 53% “For”, 30% “Against”). But we should point out the high percentage of respondents who found it difficult to answer (17%), which is not surprising since in the EAEU we are talking about a hypothetical common currency, whereas in the EU it already exists in reality.

Also highly similar are the opinions of respondents in the EU and the EAEU with respect to citizens’ free movement and the opportunity to take up residence, work, and study within...
the union: three-quarters of respondents in both unions express a positive view of such opportunities for citizens of the countries in the union.

At the same time, respondents’ positions differ on questions about the expansion of the unions through other countries’ accession. Most Eurobarometer participants in 2012 voiced opinions against expanding the EU (53%), and proponents formed a minority (36%). In contrast, today, the expansion of the EAEU is viewed favourably by a majority of its member states (an average of 65% are “For”, and only 16% are “Against”).

We obtain a similar result when comparing the positions of citizens of EU member states and EAEU member states with respect to the conclusion of an agreement on free trade and investments with other countries: in the first case, between EU countries and the United States; in the second case, between EAEU countries and the EU. Clearly, the majority of respondents in both cases are in favour of concluding such an agreement. But in terms of the ratio of supporters of an agreement on free trade and investments to those who oppose such an agreement, the survey results vary significantly. In EU countries, nearly one-third of respondents are opposed to an agreement between EU countries and the United States. Supporters account for barely more than one half of respondents. In EAEU countries, only one in ten respondents are against an agreement between EAEU countries and the EU, while 76% are in favour.

This manifests a difference in the views on the development of integration processes between the “old” EU and the “young” EAEU. Respondents from EAEU countries are as yet more optimistic and desirous to expand integration and ties with other countries, while EU countries are seeing growing scepticism for interstate integration.

1.3. Opinions regarding the prospects of integration processes in the post-Soviet space

Conceptions of the short-term prospects of a unifying process are an important indicator of citizens’ attitudes toward integrating the countries of the CIS region. The EDB Integration Barometer questionnaire includes a corresponding direct question: “Do you think that in the next five years the CIS countries (former USSR) will converge or move apart, or that nothing will change substantially?” (Figure 1.3).

At present, the citizens of the countries of the Central Asian subregion are most optimistic about the prospects of integration processes. In Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, close to or more than half (from 51% to 60%) of respondents believe that in the next five years, the countries of the CIS region will converge. As compared with 2015, we note that the share of optimists in Kyrgyzstan has fallen (by 10 pp), but this country is still more positively inclined relative to this indicator.

In Russia, Belarus, and Moldova, the number of “integration optimists” is less impressive. They do not comprise a dominant group, but there are noticeably more of them than sceptics (36%–41% optimists, 7%–15% sceptics). Moreover, in Moldova, we can see a statistically significant positive trend in this indicator (from 29% in 2015 to 38% in 2016). There are no 2016 data for Georgia and Ukraine, but from 2013 to 2015 a negative trend was recorded (more pessimists and fewer optimists).
Ukraine — in which, since 2014, the share of respondents who believe that CIS countries will increasingly move apart exceeds the share of respondents who hold the opposite view — is joined by Armenia in 2016. Today, only 14% of Armenian citizens are optimistic about the prospects of integration processes, which is 12 pp less than one year ago. One in five of the republic’s citizens holds a pessimistic view, and roughly half of the population does not expect any changes. As is shown above, the share of Armenian citizens with a favourable opinion of economic unions in the post-Soviet space has also decreased. Evidently, the negative shift in Armenian public opinion has been caused by the country’s difficult domestic and foreign political situation over the last year.
2. Political attraction

Political integration and unification of states in military and political unions with the corresponding allied obligations are to a certain extent the pinnacle of integration processes. However, everyday ideas about the political integration of countries is a rather complex aspect of public opinion. Despite the fact that it is the public’s political opinions, sympathies, and antipathies that most frequently receive the attention of pollsters and the media, we must remember that in this case respondents are expressing their opinions about questions that have little relation to their everyday lives and only marginally concern their daily routines, with rare exception. The public’s foreign-political sentiments largely rely not on respondents’ personal experience and background but on reports from the media and other “information intermediaries” (for example, social networks). These sentiments are substantially the product of the information context, propaganda, and modern mythologemes. Accordingly, the public’s foreign-political sympathies/antipathies may fluctuate widely since they are tied to the sequence of events and the state of political affairs.

The events of 2015–2016 surrounding the Russian–Ukrainian and Armenian–Azerbaijan conflicts are undoubtedly significant factors in the formation of public sentiment in the countries of the post-Soviet space, which is supported by the fluctuations in respondents’ answers. The dispositions of the citizens of some countries have shifted, and new trends have emerged. However, in other countries, we see relatively unified opinions regarding political (especially military-political) interaction between states.

2.1. Perceptions of the friendliness/unfriendliness of other countries

The first indicator of countries’ political closeness/distance is the citizens’ conceptions regarding which states are friendly/unfriendly.

Figure 2.1. presents the distribution of answers to the corresponding survey question — “In your opinion, which of the listed countries are friends to our country (i.e., countries we can rely on for help in an hour of need)?” — grouped by the four country categories.

The chart clearly shows that the populations of countries participating in the research still express the strong “inward” orientation of the CIS region, manifested in the favourable attitudes of the respondents of most countries toward the countries of this region.

An average of 82% of references to CIS countries as friendly were recorded in the countries participating in the research in 2016. The lowest results come from Moldova (65%, though this figure also grew by 7 pp year-on-year) and Armenia, which dropped by 13 pp to 72% in 2016. Thus, while the trend toward perceiving CIS countries as less friendly, which began two years ago, has turned somewhat in Moldova, then Armenia’s indicator has dropped to its lowest value in the five years of observations. Apparently, this result

5 Recall that in 2016, the EDB Integration Barometer survey was not conducted in Georgia and Ukraine, where the corresponding indicators have been consistently low in recent years.
2. POLITICAL ATTRACTION

* Here and in similar diagrams (grouped by the clusters “Countries of the CIS region,” “European Union countries,” and “Rest of the world” — “Other countries”) that follow, percentages are calculated as the share of respondents who mention at least one country from the corresponding country cluster. For example, Figure 2.1 shows that in 2016, 90% of the residents of Tajikistan mention (as friendly) at least one country from the CIS region, 6% mention at least one country from the European Union, and 27% mention at least one country from the rest of the world (see the “Tajikistan” columns for 2016).
is linked to Armenians’ disappointment in the position taken by the countries of the EAEU and the CSTO (above all, Russia) with respect to the new round of confrontations with Azerbaijan surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh.

The most significant deviations from the general trend (which we might call “outward” orientations) are seen in the following instances:

- “European Union countries” are still most frequently mentioned as friendly in Moldova (47%) and Armenia (29%). A slight rise in this indicator is seen in Russia, where after last year’s five-year low (14%) there is a return to the 2014 level (17%). In Belarus, since 2014, the indicator has grown slowly, reaching a five-year high in 2016 (15%).

- In 2016 the “Rest of the world” is mentioned as friendly most often in Russia (49%) and Belarus (31%). In both cases, China is named the main object of friendly sentiments (45% in Russia and 30% in Belarus). Kyrgyzstan comes next (26%). However, despite having some of the highest pro-Russian orientations, here the most friendly country from the “rest of the world” is Turkey (14%), with whom Russia’s relations were highly strained while the survey was conducted. A decrease in the friendliness of the countries of the “rest of the world” is registered in Kazakhstan (from 30% to 21%) and Tajikistan (from 37% to 27%).

- Armenia leads in terms of responses indicating no friendly countries and an increased percentage of respondents who found it difficult to answer in 2016 (20%). As compared with last year, Armenia’s indicator doubled to reach a five-year high.

Despite the fact that in 2016 the research was not conducted in Ukraine, it is obvious that Ukraine remains the leader in terms of pro-European sentiment in the CIS region because, from 2012 through 2015, the percentage of respondents who perceived EU countries as friendly grew by 23 pp, reaching 51%.

Within the post-Soviet space in 2014–2016, the most favourable attitudes were registered toward Russia: respondents place Russia first in terms of mentions of a “friendly country” among all of the countries participating in the research in 2016 (Figure 2.2). As before, Russia’s highest scores as a friendly country are recorded in Kyrgyzstan (89%), Tajikistan (82%, though this is an 8 pp drop relative to last year), Belarus (82%), and Kazakhstan (81%). However, Armenia, which before 2016 also produced some of the highest indications of a friendly perception of Russia, experiences a noticeable decline (by 17 pp) to 69% in 2016. This result is apparently influenced by dissatisfaction with Russia’s position on the Armenian–Azerbaijan conflict which escalated in 2015–2016 in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as a significant rise in prices for electricity, which is supplied by Russian companies. The sympathies of the citizens of Moldova for Russia have stabilized. In Moldova, the share of respondents who perceive Russia as a friendly country grew by 9 pp over the year to 55%, thus reaching its 2014 level. The second “friendly country” for citizens of Moldova is Romania, which is chosen by 36% of respondents.

For their part, Russians believe the most friendly countries to be Belarus (65%), Kazakhstan (51%), China (41%), and Armenia (35%). In addition to the United States (3%), the country named least often as friendly is Turkey, whose indicator slipped to 3% after a five-year high (13%). Observably, this is connected to the public deterioration of Russian-Turkish relations, chiefly due to Syria (where Turkish forces shot down a Russian warplane in 2015).
Interestingly, relative to the previous year, Russia registers a doubling of the perception that Ukraine (8%) and Georgia (16%) are friendly countries (this is the highest result since 2012).

Thus, despite the continued prevailing positive perception of the friendliness of traditional allies in the post-Soviet space (except for Ukraine, which dropped out of this group after 2014), we can also note, in 2016, a certain, as-yet small, increase in the perception of the friendliness of Russia’s “official” geopolitical enemies (rivals) of recent years, namely Ukraine, Georgia, EU countries, and even (by 2 pp) the United States. Certainly, this change in public sentiment needs to be verified in subsequent surveys.
We again emphasize the rather high volatility of these indicators. For example, over the course of just two years (from 2013 to 2015), Ukrainian attitudes toward Russia as a friendly country plummeted by an entire 45 pp (to 9%). In Armenia in 2016, the perception that Georgia is a friendly country fell by more than half — from 27% to 13%. In Belarus, the perception that Russia is a friendly country reached 82% (a high for the five years of research), though it slipped slightly for to Kazakhstan (from 54% to 48%) and Georgia (from 27% to 22%). In 2016, Kazakhstan, in turn, sees the perceived friendliness toward Belarus fall by 13 pp (to 35%), which is its lowest result since 2013. This indicator also decreased relative to Armenia from 26% to 21%, Uzbekistan from 20% to 15%, China from 16% to 9%, Turkey from 18% to 11%, and Japan from 10% to 4%.

We also gain important information from the so-called “autonomy” indicator, which represents the share of respondents who found it difficult to answer or who report that there are “no friendly countries.” While last year the “autonomy” leaders were Ukraine (23%), Georgia (21%), and Russia (15%), in 2016 Armenia takes first place (20%, where 18% are those who believe that there are no friendly countries; this represents a 10 pp increase for this group). Next come Russia (16%), Moldova (14%), and Belarus (13%).

The opposite question, regarding the “unfriendliness” of countries, is no less informative for understanding the political tension between states (Figure 2.3). In this case, the distribution of answers has shifted in the same direction as the distribution of answers about friends: toward CIS countries. In other words, we can say that the public consciousness of many countries where the research was conducted in 2016 (except, perhaps, Belarus) includes the unfriendliness of countries among the CIS countries.

The highest values for “threats from CIS countries” are characteristic of Armenia (97%, a five-year high), as well as Kyrgyzstan (64%) and Russia (63%) where in both countries the indicator is at its highest value since 2014. As in previous years, the indicator’s lowest value is produced by Belarus (13%). But Kazakhstan, which took second place after Belarus last year, experiences a noticeable rise in this indicator (by 13 pp), reaching 34% in 2016. The highest value of this indicator regarding European Union countries is reported in Russia with 28% (but this represents an 11 pp decrease). In Belarus, this indicator dropped 4 pp (to 17%, its lowest value since 2012).

The highest level of perceived threats from the “rest of the world” is reported in Armenia where this indicator grew by 9 pp (to 84%), which is a five-year high. This is obviously also related to the escalation of the confrontation with Azerbaijan and intensifying anxieties due to the threats from its foreign political allies, mainly Turkey, and, consequently, the countries of NATO.

Quite a few respondents in Russia (76%), Belarus (47%), and Kazakhstan (40%) are anxious towards the “rest of the world.” In Kyrgyzstan, the prevalence of these anxieties decreased from 35% to 20%.

The answers to the question about “unfriendliness” eloquently demonstrate the fears and anxieties of the populations of the countries of the CIS region (see Figure 2.4). The greatest level of hostile feelings in the post-Soviet space is consistently recorded in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. In 2016 in Armenia, the indicator for the unfriendliness
towards Azerbaijan reaches the highest five-year mark among all of the countries participating in the re-search: 97% (a 7 pp increase). The level of perception of Turkey as unfriendly (83%) also reaches a five-year high. Notably, similar values were also reached in relation to Russia (representing an increase from 1% to 5%). Moreover, feelings of hostility toward the United States decreased slightly (from 6% to 3%).
In Belarus, since 2014, perceptions of unfriendliness have been trending downward with respect to the United States (from 54% in 2014 to 41% in 2016) and leading EU countries: Great Britain (from 21% to 13%), Germany (from 19% to 14%), and France (from 16% to 11%). We may conjecture that this small but perceptible reduction in hostility toward the “West” is the result of Ukraine’s “European pivot” and the “pro-European” aspirations of a portion of Belarusian society.

Kazakhstani respondents identified the most unfriendly state as Ukraine (23%, 9 pp higher than last year). However, the disapproval rate jumped most significantly relative to China: the indicator doubled (to 22%).

In Kyrgyzstan, the most hostile country is perceived to be Uzbekistan, the dislike for which reached a five-year high at 52% (having increased by 8 pp over the year).
Moreover, the level of hostility was seen to decrease, towards Tajikistan by 12 pp (to 13%) and United States by 10 pp (to 16%).

The perception of Uzbekistan’s unfriendliness also grew in Tajikistan (to 37%).

In Moldova, though Russia is the country most often named as unfriendly (by 19% of respondents), such responses are 9 pp lower than in 2015, and 13% of respondents also consider Romania to be a hostile country. Recall that these two countries also lead in perceptions of friendliness.

However, in Russia, the countries most often considered unfriendly are United States (by 62% of respondents, though this represents a 15 pp reduction) and Ukraine (by 57%, which is a three-year high), whose “hostility” has grown steadily from 34% in 2014. The greatest change in the “unfriendliness” indicator was seen in relation to Turkey (49%), having increased by 46 pp. Such a gigantic jump has never before been seen in the EDB Integration Barometer’s five years of observations.

The country perceived as the most threatening to the post-Soviet space remains the United States, which for three years has been among the top three unfriendly countries named by each of the seven countries participating in the research in 2016 (in Armenia, admittedly, by an insignificant percentage of respondents).

Thus, we may say that beginning in 2014, in the post-Soviet space, two major axes of foreign political “hostility” have taken shape: Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan versus the United States, Georgia, and Ukraine; and part of Moldova versus Russia. However, in Moldova we have noted a decline in anti-Russian sentiment and an increase in the number of people who would allow military assistance from Russia. At the same time, in Russia, despite the growing perception that Ukraine is hostile, the perception that Moldova is hostile is only 4%, and Georgia 13%, which is five times less than the hostility perceived by Georgians and Moldovans.

Concerning the combined share of “None” and “It’s hard to say” responses (Figure 2.3), in 2016, according to this indicator, the “least alarmed” countries were Moldova (51% of respondents could not name any “unfriendly countries”), Belarus (48%), and Kazakhstan (41%), through for the latter this indicator decreased over the year by 14 pp (that is, the anxiety level increased). Armenia’s population remains the most “alarmed” — only 1% of those surveyed expressed an absence of external threats.

2.2. Military-political cooperation vectors

The second key indicator of political closeness between countries is the potential for mutual military support. The EDB Integration Barometer considers two aspects of public perception of military cooperation: “Who can we help?” (preferred recipients of military support) and “From whom can we accept help?” (preferred providers of military support).

In matters of military-political cooperation, citizens of CIS countries also proved to be largely oriented “inward” toward the post-Soviet space (Figure 2.5). However, in specific countries, there is considerable variation in public opinion on this matter.
The number of respondents in Armenia who would allow military-political support to be given to CIS countries fell dramatically from 49% in 2015 to 31%. In Belarus, by contrast, this indicator grew 12 pp, reaching 68%.

European Union countries were, as before, hardly mentioned as potential recipients of military support. However, in 2016, pro-European sentiments grew in Kazakhstan from 2% to 11% (reaching a five-year high). As for the inclination to provide military support...
to countries in the rest of the world, Russia was most significant (31% of respondents were willing to provide such military support, above all to China and India), while the greatest increase was seen in Kazakhstan — from 9% to 16%.

In 2016, there were several changes to the percentage of “autonomous” answers, i.e., “None” and “It’s hard to say” (Figure 2.5). In Belarus, it fell by 10 pp (to 32%), but it grew by 5 pp in Moldova (to 76%) and by 9 pp in Tajikistan (to 48%). However, the greatest increase of such sentiments (+13 pp) took place in Armenia where they reached 62%.

As was the case last year, Russia was most frequently named as a recipient of potential military support (Figure 2.6). Russia, again, was mentioned in this regard more often in five of the seven surveyed countries. And while relative to last year there were no major changes in this indicator in Kyrgyzstan (36%), Kazakhstan (59%), and Moldova (14%), Armenia experienced a 17 pp drop to a five-year low (29%).

Additionally, after last year’s decline to 47%, in Belarus this indicator of public support for Russia increased to 61%. In turn, Russian public support for Belarus reached a five-year high (48%). This may be associated with the post-Soviet space’s two friendliest countries’ concerns with regard to the 2015–2016 opening of new NATO military sites and bases close to their borders and the accompanying communications buzz.

Beside Belarus, the countries most often mentioned as potential recipients of military support were Kazakhstan (36%) and Armenia (26%). Notably, this indicator grew 4 pp in relation to Georgia (16%; this is the highest level over five years of observations). And this is at a time when in Georgia only 3% (based on 2015 data) are willing to render mutual military support to Russia. Additionally, the results for NATO countries increased, though insignificantly: for Great Britain, Germany, and France (from 3–4% to 6–8%) and even the United States (from 1% to 5%). Such a distribution of responses again indicates that, besides a substantial orientation toward providing support to the countries of the CIS region, China (22%), and India (17%), which can be designated a “Eurasian” vector, there may be forming a smaller but already perceptible “pro-Western” vector for potential military support (which in addition to the United States and EU countries could include Ukraine and Georgia).

In Armenia, the trend toward decreased willingness to help Georgia continues (from 15% in 2014 to 5% in 2016). The percentage of the Armenian population that believes there are no countries to which military support should be rendered grew by 21 pp (to 52%). This is a five-year high.

Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia saw a small increase (by 4–5 pp) in the percentage of respondents willing to give military support to most of the CIS countries (including Ukraine). Yet Kazakhstan registered similar growth in the same attitudes toward Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia.

Compared to last year, Kyrgyzstan has retained its five-year high for the level of support for Russia (36%).

In Moldova, those who believe there are no countries to which military support should be rendered represented the largest share of the population (60%). However, 14% of the country is willing to help Russia — this is the highest value among all of the other countries.
In Tajikistan, the number of respondents who believe *there are no* potential recipients for military support grew by 15 pp (to 31%).

When responding to the question “*From whom can we accept military and political support?*”, the populations of most of the countries participating in the project, as in previous years, are oriented “inward” toward the post-Soviet space (Figure 2.7). There were no major changes over the past year, except in Moldova where the number of those willing to accept help from *CIS countries* grew by 7 pp from last year’s five-year low to 51% in 2016; and in Armenia, which, by contrast, saw a 11 pp drop in this indicator to a five-year low (73%).

In 2016, willingness to accept military support from *EU countries* grew by 4 pp both in Russia (to 10%) and in Belarus (to 9%), which again indicates a certain rise in “pro-European/pro-Western” sentiment in the public consciousness towards the most friendly countries of the post-Soviet space.
2. POLITICAL ATTRACTION

Figure 2.7. Regarding military and political aid, from which of these countries would our country accept such aid? (Responses grouped by four attraction vectors)

Interest in countries of the CIS region:

Interest in countries of the European Union:

Interest in “other countries”:

No interest in any country clusters (“autonomy”):

Note: the question was not asked in Kazakhstan in 2016.
The number of those who would allow military support from the countries of the “rest of the world” decreased in Russia (to 30%) and increased in Armenia (to 16%). The combined share of “None” and “It’s hard to say” answers in 2016 remained highest in Russia where it increased by another 5 pp (to 45%). Relative to this question, the Russian population remains the most autonomous, being largely unwilling to accept foreign military support. Such sentiments also increased in Armenia, by 7 pp (to 22%).

For five years, Russia has consistently been named most often as a possible provider of military support (Figure 2.8) in Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Tajikistan (the question was not asked in Kazakhstan, which has traditionally been friendly...
with the Russian Federation). Moreover, Belarusian respondents’ expectations were more than double those of Russians with respect to Belarus.

In Armenia, 72% of respondents are willing to accept help from Russia (but this is a five-year low; last year, it was 10 pp higher). France (15%) and the United States (10%) were also mentioned in this context.

As was the case with the question about friendly countries, Belarus demonstrated an inclination to accept support from the conventional “Eurasian bloc”: Russia (73%), Kazakhstan (22%), and China (13%). However, the results grew, though insignificantly, by 2–3 pp for the conventional “Western bloc” — the United States, Germany, France, and other EU countries (to 4–5%).

Kyrgyzstan is the country whose population is most willing to accept military support from Russia (87%, a five-year high). In Tajikistan, the number of respondents who would allow military support from Russia slipped somewhat from 79% to 71%.

In Moldova, the percentage of those willing to accept military support from Russia and “Other EU countries” (chiefly Romania) grew by 6 pp (to 47%) and 5 pp (to 21%), respectively.

In Russia, opinions about permissible military support are identical to those in Belarus: besides Belarus, Russians would accept help from Kazakhstan and China. However, the hopes resting on all of these countries decreased: by 2–3 pp with respect to Belarus and Kazakhstan and from 31% to 24% with respect to China.
3. Economic attraction

Economic cooperation among countries is undoubtedly the basis for rational and stable interstate integration. In this sense, any country’s economic attractiveness is, of course, a powerful stimulus for public support for integration and cooperation with that country. This section contains descriptive and analytical information about the economic attractiveness of the CIS countries. It includes a treatment of the following aspects of economic attraction:

- Consumer preferences of the populations of the countries in the studied region
- Opinions relative to the arrival of investments and business in countries’ markets
- Preferences regarding international cooperation in science and technology
- Migration plans of the populations of the countries in the studied region: labour migration and emigration with the purpose of obtaining a permanent place of residence
- Migration inclinations related to the immigration-inflow preference vectors (labour and student migration)

3.1. Consumer preferences

In everyday life experiences, consumption is among the most common forms of economic behaviour. When it comes to consumer choice, we can quite clearly note stereotypes and inclinations with respect to the affordability, quality, and attractiveness of imported goods. The EDB Integration Barometer measures consumer preferences through the question “Which countries’ products do you prefer to buy and trust the most?”

The data gathered in EDB Integration Barometer 2016 do not indicate any statistically significant differences between the three blocs of countries: CIS region, European Union and Rest of the world (based on the average responses for the 7 countries). Purchasing goods from European Union countries is somewhat less attractive (an average of 42% of responses), while consumer preferences for products from CIS countries and the rest of the world are on par this year.

We will point out the distinctive features of the attractiveness of the groups of countries with respect to consumption and cite data regarding the countries for which one of the three geopolitical vectors was preferred over the others. See Figure 3.1.

Continuing the trend of recent years, goods produced in countries of the CIS region enjoy the greatest popularity in countries of the Central Asian subregion: Tajikistan (72%) and Kazakhstan (62%). In Kyrgyzstan the percentage of residents who prefer goods from CIS countries is rather high (56%), but, unlike in the countries mentioned above, it does not represent an overwhelming majority.

Among the sampled countries, the population of Moldova (56%) is most loyal to products imported from EU countries. The respondents from Kyrgyzstan (62%) are somewhat more positive toward goods from “Other countries.”
The residents of Russia and Belarus were most similar in their consumer preferences; both countries had approximately the same level of preference for goods imported from the European Union and “Other countries” (the percentage of respondents choosing the countries in these blocs varied from 44% in Russia to 51% in Belarus). However, the population of Belarus was slightly more oriented toward buying products produced...
in *CIS countries*. Armenia expressed loyalty to imported goods from countries of the *CIS region* and countries of the *European Community* (Figure 3.1).

The 2016 research saw the following changes in public opinion relative to the previous waves of the project:

- Kyrgyzstan has seen a sharp rise in interest in buying goods from *CIS countries* (a 22 pp increase relative to 2015, from 34% to 56%). This trend (but not as pronounced in terms of the increase in the percentage of respondents) is also characteristic of Russia and Belarus.

- A trend toward an increasing attractiveness of goods from *European Union countries* is seen in every country participating in the survey, except Tajikistan. The popularity of products imported from countries of the European Union has grown considerably, in Moldova by 20 pp (from 36% in 2015 to 56% in 2016), in Armenia by 15 pp (from 33% to 48%), in Tajikistan by 13 pp (from 16% to 29%), and in Russia by 12 pp (from 36% to 44%).

- In Kyrgyzstan, the interest in products from *countries of the CIS region* and the *European Union* has been accompanied by a decline in the popularity of goods from “*Other countries*”: the percentage of the population that prefers European goods decreased from 77% to 62%. In the other countries where the survey was conducted in 2016, we note either a substantial increase in consumer loyalty to imports from countries in the European Union (Belarus, from 41% to 51%; Tajikistan, from 50% to 58%) or effectively no changes, accompanied by insignificant fluctuations (Figure 3.1).

From 3% to 42% of respondents in various countries had difficulty naming even one country whose goods they preferred (Figure 3.1). The share of such “non-responses” may, with some qualifications, be interpreted as the public’s level of orientation toward the domestic market (in this case, the consumer goods market). On average for all of the countries, 23% of the population is inclined toward being indifferent with respect to consumer goods.

Residents of Moldova (42%), Russia (35%), and Armenia (30%) are most oriented toward their *domestic (national) markets*; the countries least oriented toward their domestic markets are Tajikistan (3%) and Kyrgyzstan (8%) (Figure 3.1).

The EDB Integration Barometer’s fifth wave survey did not register significant changes in public attitudes toward consumer autonomy in the surveyed countries.

Based on the average indicators for 2014–2016, *Russia, Germany,* and *Turkey* are most often the top three countries preferred by other countries in terms of the goods they produce. Other countries mentioned in the top three include *Japan, China, United States, Belarus, France,* and some other *EU countries* (see Figure 3.2).

The consumer preferences of citizens in the Central Asian subregion are the most similar. *Russia* receives the largest share of preferences: the greatest response was seen in Tajikistan where Russian-made goods are preferred by 66% of the population, followed by Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan where roughly half of the population mention *Russia* (52% and 49% of respondents, respectively). Moreover, in 2016 Kyrgyzstan sees a significant increase in the percentage of the population in favour of buying goods from
Russia (by 23 pp), while Kazakhstan shows a decline in the popularity of Russian products (by 13 pp). Second place is taken by Turkey, whose imported goods are most popular in Kyrgyzstan (43% of preferences), Kazakhstan (36%), and Tajikistan (28%). Moreover, for the latter, the attractiveness of goods from Turkey decreases somewhat (by 8 pp), while in Kazakhstan it grows (by 6 pp) (Figure 3.2).

Goods from Germany are popular with roughly one third of people in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus area of the CIS region, namely in Belarus (38%), Ukraine (37%)\textsuperscript{6}, Russia (28%), Moldova (37%), Georgia (44%)\textsuperscript{7}, and Armenia (33%), where demand for German products has risen slightly.

\textsuperscript{6} 2015 data.
\textsuperscript{7} 2015 data.
3.2. Preferred sources of foreign capital

An inflow of foreign capital and the arrival of companies and investors in a domestic market promote a country’s economic development by creating jobs and producing goods and services. Trust towards foreign capital was gauged with the following question: “From which countries would it be desirable for our country to receive capital, investments, and an influx of companies, entrepreneurs, and businessmen to set up their firms among us?”

Based on the results of the 2016 survey, on average half of the population in the surveyed countries approves of an inflow of foreign investments and the arrival of companies from the geographically close countries of the CIS region and countries of the “rest of the world” (46% for each country category). The average figure for the confidence in an inflow of capital from European Union countries is somewhat lower at 40%.

Despite a slight decline, the populations of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan demonstrate the greatest interest in the arrival of businesses from CIS countries in comparison with other countries. Nevertheless, the past year sees a significant reduction in the percentage of the population in support of an inflow of capital from CIS countries into Tajikistan (from 75% to 64%, which is roughly equal to the level in 2013) and into Kyrgyzstan (from 64% to 54%) (Figure 3.3).

An influx of investments and companies from European Union countries is most desirable in Moldova where this economic development vector is backed by 57% of the population. Attitudes toward European investments and business entities have remained essentially unchanged since 2014 in all countries except those of the Central Asian subregion. In Kyrgyzstan, the percentage of the population favourable toward European companies and capital increases to one quarter (in 2015, this indicator was 16%). By contrast, in Kazakhstan, their popularity diminishes somewhat.

In 2016, not one country expresses a strong preference for foreign investments from countries in the “Other countries” bloc. In 2015, Georgia held the top position with 66% of preferences (Figure 3.3).

Among dramatic changes, we must point out Tajikistan’s nearly doubled interest in an inflow of foreign capital (as compared with 2015, it increased from 23% to 45%). A considerable rise in interest is also seen in Kyrgyzstan (from 42% to 56%).

At the same time, Armenia and Belarus exhibit an orientation toward three country blocks — CIS, European Union and Other countries — that are potentially open to business integration (especially in 2015–2016). The Russian population most often approves of an inflow of capital from European Union countries and “Other countries” (i.e., not from the CIS region).

A large portion of those surveyed in the seven countries who participated in the research project’s fifth wave support a policy of economic openness to the possibility of attracting foreign business. On average, the “inclination for autonomy” indicator stands at 20%. The countries closest to this value are Belarus (19%), Moldova (19%), and Armenia (19%). The countries most inclined to prefer a closed economy are those with the largest territories and major economies — Russia (40%) and Kazakhstan (34%). The population of Tajikistan is most open to the arrival of business (only 3% of respondents found it difficult to answer) (Figure 3.3).
The ranking of the most desirable investor countries includes Russia, Germany, United States, China, and Japan. As with other questions of economic attractiveness, more than half of the respondents in countries such as Tajikistan (56%), Kyrgyzstan (52%), and Belarus (53%) support drawing closer to business from Russia. The populations of Moldova (42%) and Armenia (38%) are also oriented toward cooperation with Russian companies.
We should point out that Russia’s position as a source of investment and business activity notably decreased in 2016 in countries where Russian business have previously been consistently popular, i.e. Tajikistan (a decrease of 13 pp), Kazakhstan (10 pp), and Armenia (8 pp) (Figure 3.4).

Economic integration with Germany in the form of attracting investments and business activity is desired in all countries. Particularly large percentages of the population in Ukraine (46%)\(^8\), Moldova (44%), Georgia (41%)\(^9\), and Belarus (40%) hold this position. Countries such as Georgia (52%), Ukraine (46%), and Moldova (27%) demonstrate their traditional loyalty to an inflow of investments from the United States. The populations of Belarus (42%), Russia (27%), and Tajikistan (23%) express a desire for an inflow of capital and the arrival of businesses from China (Figure 3.4).

\(^{8}\) 2015 data.

\(^{9}\) 2015 data.
3.3. Preferences regarding cooperation in science and technology

The innovation sector of the economy is represented by engineering developments and high-tech production. Public opinion in the surveyed countries with respect to integration in this area was gauged through the following question: “With which countries would it be beneficial to our government and businesses to engage in scientific and technological cooperation, conduct joint research, and exchange developments, technologies, and scientific ideas?”

The average values over all of the sampled countries differ for this question. For example, we observe a preponderance of mentions of countries of the “rest of the world” (54%), while interest in CIS countries is expressed by 44% of those surveyed, and 44% of respondents express interest in European Union countries.

The opportunity to cooperate in scientific and technological matters with countries of the CIS bloc is most attractive to the residents of Tajikistan (66%). Notably, this is the only country in the sample where respondents prefer scientific and technological collaboration with CIS countries to other political and territorial blocs (Figure 3.5).

According to the 2016 survey, scientific and technological cooperation with European Union countries is not a priority for any of the surveyed countries.

All of the surveyed countries, except Moldova and Kazakhstan, would prefer to conduct joint research and exchange developments and technological and scientific ideas with countries of the “rest of the world.”

In terms of dramatic changes, we should point out:

- The decrease in interest in scientific and technological cooperation with CIS countries on the part of Kyrgyzstan (the percentage of the population expressing preference for these countries decreased from 58% in 2015 to 24% in 2016) and somewhat on the part of Armenia (from 42% to 38%). This area of cooperation experiences a slight rise in popularity in Belarus and Moldova (Figure 3.5).

- In Tajikistan, the percentage of the population in support of scientific and technological cooperation with countries of the “rest of the world” increased considerably: these indicators grew from 31% to 50%. A positive trend can also be seen in Kyrgyzstan where the share of the population that is similarly disposed grew from 50% to 61%.

The majority of the populations of the surveyed countries in the portion of the post-Soviet space under consideration are oriented toward an open exchange of scientific knowledge and technologies through international cooperation. On average for the seven countries, only 15% of respondents are unable to name a single country with which it would be desirable to cooperate in these matters. The countries most open to scientific and technological exchange are Tajikistan (only 4% of respondents favour “autonomy”) and Kyrgyzstan (7%), where nearly all respondents answer in favour of establishing international ties in this area. The countries least open to such exchange are Russia and Kazakhstan (23% and 21%, respectively) (Figure 3.5).

Among all of the countries, orientation toward partnerships in science and technology is associated with Russia (which, over the seven countries, an average of 40% of respondents mention), Germany (32%), and Japan (31%).
The populations of Tajikistan (58%), Belarus (53%), and Moldova (44%) are most interested in Russia as a partner in scientific and technological development and collaboration. As compared with 2015, the prospect of working with Russia in this area attracts smaller percentages of the populations of Kyrgyzstan (a decrease from 53% to 39%), Kazakhstan (from 49% to 41%), and Armenia (from 40% to 28%) (Figure 3.6).
Scientific and technological cooperation with *Germany* is attractive to the populations of all countries, especially Georgia (46%), Belarus (44%), Ukraine (43%), and Moldova (41%). *Japan* is a desirable and promising partner for scientific exchange and collaboration for Russia (49%), Georgia (42%), Ukraine (41%), and Belarus (41%) (as well as Kazakhstan with 31% of preferences) (Figure 3.6).

### 3.4. Immigration preferences (labour attraction)

Above, we examined which countries respondents consider desirable as sources of investment and as partners in scientific and technological cooperation. Accordingly, we analysed and described vectors for the inflow of financial and scientific resources. No less important for a country’s development is its ability to attract human (labour) resources.
Inclinations and opinions regarding the inflow into a country of foreign students and skilled and unskilled workers are some of the key indicators of the sociocultural closeness of countries and their potential economic cooperation.

The willingness to receive immigrants into one’s country depends on many factors (ethnic commonality, a shared cultural and historic background, the level of development of the receiving and donor countries, etc.) that require separate examination. Later, we will present evidence of public attitudes in CIS countries regarding the inflow of immigrants.

The average values for country categories support the hypothesis that territorial proximity and a common background help form positive attitudes toward an inflow of immigrants. CIS countries receive 41% of preferences as compared with the “rest of the world” (34%) and European Union (31%).

The three Central Asian countries — Tajikistan (63%), Kyrgyzstan (45%), and Kazakhstan (43%) — have traditionally been the most positive towards immigrants from the countries of the post-Soviet space. Moreover, more than one-third of the population of Belarus (38%) has a favourable attitude toward the arrival of students, workers, and professionals from CIS countries (Figure 3.7).

An inflow of human resources from EU states is preferred (but not by a significant margin relative to the other blocs) in Armenia and Moldova (by 46% of respondents in each country) and Ukraine (38%)10.

Despite the relatively high average value, the “rest of the world” cluster is not so popular as a potential source for an inflow of students and workers.

Changes in public opinion about the inflow of immigrants primarily concern the countries of Central Asia. For example, in 2016 the percentage of the population in support of an inflow of immigrants from CIS countries decreases substantially in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, and to a lesser degree Kyrgyzstan. In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, this decline is accompanied by a jump in interest in attracting foreign students, workers, and professionals from “rest of the world” (Figure 3.7).

The aggregate indicator for respondents who found it difficult to choose a country they would receive immigrants from has remained quite high from 2012 through 2016 and this year amounts to roughly one-third of respondents (32%) on average across the seven countries. In 2016, residents of Russia and Belarus are most oriented toward the domestic labour markets (over 40% of respondents selected “It’s hard to say” or “None”) (Figure 3.7). Kazakhstan sees a substantial increase in the percentage of the population in support of not receiving foreign labour resources (including students).

Within the post-Soviet space, Russia remains the preferred source for students, workers, and skilled professionals. On average, 36% of respondents in the surveyed countries select Russia in this regard. Germany takes second place with 23%, followed by France (15%), the United States (13%), and “Other countries.”

Among the most notable trends of 2016 is the significant decrease in Russia’s popularity in Tajikistan where, in 2015, the idea of an inflow of Russian immigrants is supported by 58% of the population but in 2016 by 45%, in Kazakhstan (a decrease from 45% to 32%), and in Armenia (from 38% to 30%) (Figure 3.8).

10 2015 data.
Attitudes toward immigrants from Germany are positive in Armenia (34%), Moldova (31%), Ukraine (29%)\textsuperscript{11}, and Belarus (24%). Romanian workers are traditionally welcome in Moldova (21%).

\textsuperscript{11} 2015 data.
3.5. Labour migration plans

A population’s migration plans are an important indicator of the donor country’s socio-economic position as well as the attractiveness of the country expected to receive the international migrants. Of the three geopolitical blocs, “CIS countries” is the most attractive destination for potential labour migration with an average value of 28%, while European Union countries and the “rest of the world” cluster receive 22% and 20% of preferences, respectively. The following important deviations from average values may be noted in individual countries (Figure 3.9):

- In the Central Asian bloc — Tajikistan (51%), Kyrgyzstan (41%), and Kazakhstan (32%) — the “CIS countries” preference vector is expressed most often.
However, we have seen a certain decline in the popularity of this vector in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, while in Kazakhstan positive attitudes toward migrating into this country cluster have grown slightly.
Elevated interest in European Union countries can be seen in the Eastern European area of the post-Soviet space — in Ukraine\textsuperscript{12}, Moldova, Belarus, Russia, and Georgia\textsuperscript{13}. There have not been any major changes in the distributions as compared with 2015.

In Armenia, one quarter of the population is oriented toward each of the three geopolitical blocs with respect to this and the other aspects of economic integration.

Temporary international labour migration is still not prevalent in the plans of the population of the CIS countries: the cumulative indicator for those who had difficulty responding or selected the “None” option has remained quite high over all of the waves of the EDB Integration Barometer, and in 2016 it amounts to 44\% of respondents on average across all of the countries. The countries most oriented toward foreign labour markets

\textsuperscript{12} 2015 data.

\textsuperscript{13} 2015 data.
include Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and, above all, Kyrgyzstan (Figure 3.9). The 2016 survey does not detect significant shifts in the “autonomous” orientations of CIS countries relative to the previous waves of the EDB Integration Barometer.

On average over all of the sampled countries, the most popular destinations for potential migrant workers are Russia (27%), Germany (12%), and the United States (10%). The possibility of temporary employment in Russia is considered most often by residents of Tajikistan (43%), Kyrgyzstan (37%), Kazakhstan (24%), Moldova (26%), and Armenia (23%). The high popularity of Russia seen in Tajikistan in 2015 fell to the level of 2014 (Figure 3.10).

Among the other destinations, we should note the orientation toward temporary work in Germany among the populations of Ukraine (20%)\textsuperscript{14}, Georgia (15%)\textsuperscript{15}, Belarus (14%), and Russia (14%). Among potential migrant workers’ desired recipient countries, we can single out the United States, which is among the top three countries mentioned in Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine (18%, 18%, and 14%, respectively).

3.6. Long-term emigration plans

The public’s plans to change their country of residence serve as an indicator of a whole host of problems in the country being left behind; therefore, they are traditionally important features of public sentiment. In the EDB Integration Barometer, migration plans are measured through this question: “Which of the listed countries would you like to move to for permanent residence if the opportunity presented itself?”

In 2016, there were generally no significant differences in preferences between the country clusters. Potential emigration vectors are largely weakly expressed and targeted approximately equally for the three clusters: on average, CIS countries receive 16% of preferences, European Union countries 12%, and countries of the “rest of the world” 11%. The share of “autonomous” orientations for this question remains rather high at 66% on average across the seven countries. This is a result of the fact that changing one’s country of permanent residence is a rather serious step in the lives of ordinary citizens. Consequently, many respondents do not even consider such a possibility for themselves (though the percentage of potential emigrants in individual countries of the post-Soviet space is quite high).

Among the most significant deviations from the average, we can point out:

- The populations of the Central Asian subregion most often express interest in relocating to CIS countries: roughly one-third of the population of Tajikistan (29%), one-fifth of the residents of Kyrgyzstan (20%), and approximately the same percentage of the population of Kazakhstan (22%). The trend toward decreased attractiveness of the CIS region in Tajikistan, which was noted in 2014, has been confirmed in 2016, marked by a 10 pp reduction (Figure 3.11).

- European Union countries enjoy the greatest popularity among the residents of Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and Georgia (in the latter two countries by only 1 in 10 residents). No substantial shifts relative to the 2015 wave are noted.

\textsuperscript{14}2015 data.

\textsuperscript{15}2015 data.
The “rest of the world” category is not the most popular in any of the surveyed countries in terms of the number of mentions. This indicator’s high average value is actually provided by two countries — Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan — thanks to a relatively large number of mentions of the United States, Turkey, and countries of the Arab/Islamic world. In all countries except Moldova, Armenia, and Tajikistan, more than 60% of the population does not intend to change their place of residence (Figure 3.11). “Autonomy”
indicators are especially high in Russia and Georgia. “Autonomy” supporters also consolidate their position in Tajikistan, accounting for 55% of respondents in 2016 as compared with the 44% in 2015, who found it difficult to name a potential country for relocation.

In all, in the post-Soviet space the most attractive country for emigration remains Russia — in the 2016 surveys, it is mentioned by an average of 16% of the residents of the seven countries. Other countries are mentioned far less frequently. We will mention only the small share of respondents who indicate Germany and the United States (6% for each of these countries).

Countries with the highest indicator for potential emigration include Moldova (18%), Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (16% each), and Tajikistan, where interest in Russia drops significantly from 38% in 2015 to 22% in 2016 (Figure 3.12).

The populations of Belarus (8%) and Ukraine (11%) are more oriented toward emigration to Germany and other EU countries, as well as the United States.

\[16\] 2015 data
4. Sociocultural attractions

The routine of interaction with various countries largely determines any particular integration orientation. At present, intense personal communication is maintained between citizens of the various countries, including between relatives and friends, which in large measure is a legacy of the USSR. These communications have been supplemented by the “new” lines that have emerged from labour migrations since the 21st century began (residents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Russia, residents of Moldova in Russia and Ukraine, citizens of Uzbekistan in Russia and Kazakhstan, etc.).

In this project, sociocultural attraction is considered, first, to be the prevalence of the cognitive interests of one country relative to other countries (including with respect to culture and art) and second, to be evidence of citizens’ practical sociocultural interests relative to other countries, e.g. regularly maintained personal contacts, a desire to visit these countries as a tourist, or an interest in obtaining an education there.

4.1. Cognitive interest in other countries

Respondents’ level of cognitive interest in other countries was recorded in their answers to the question “For which of the listed countries would you say you have an interest in their history, culture, and natural geography?” We should note that the level of such interest on average across the countries of the three general geopolitical clusters is essentially identical — each of them receives approximately one-third of the mentions (Figure 4.1). However, within the averaged values, there are certain differences. For example, Moldova consistently expresses more interest (40%) in the European Union cluster then the other countries.

The greatest interest in the culture of CIS countries continues to be shown by residents of Tajikistan, but this year it wanes (from 68% to 54%), while such interest in the “rest of the world” rises slightly (from 36% to 42%). Belarusian residents’ interest in the culture of CIS countries is also very high (42%). Respondents in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are more likely than others to give answers pertaining to the “Other countries” cluster. The most “interesting” country in the post-Soviet space is Russia (Figure 4.2). In 2015, Tajikistan saw a sharp rise in interest in Russia, but in 2016 this indicator returns to the level of previous years (36%). In other countries, the indicator generally remains unchanged. Except for Belarusian residents’ interest in Ukrainian culture, greater interest in the culture of other countries of the CIS region is found anywhere. France (on par with “Other countries”) takes second place in terms of the level of incoming interest vectors.

Excluding Russia and Ukraine, countries’ ties based on cognitive interest generally prove to lack intensity. Residents of Tajikistan exhibit noticeable interest in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (12% and 10% of mentions, respectively); and the population of Moldova (10%) expresses interest in Ukraine. Belarusian residents also have an interest in Georgian culture (10%). None of the other countries of the CIS region have “incoming” interest vectors with values greater than 10%.
Figure 4.1. For which of the listed countries would you say you have an interest in their history, culture, and natural geography? (Responses grouped by four attraction vectors)

Note: this question was not asked in Kazakhstan and Russia in 2015–2016.
Residents of some countries demonstrate more “self-sufficiency”, i.e. they state they are not interested in the history, culture, or geography of a single country listed in the questionnaire (Figure 4.1). This indicator is highest in Armenia and Belarus (47% and 46% “autonomous” answers, respectively).

4.2. Personal communications with people in other countries

One of the important indicators of the sociocultural closeness of countries is the presence of real communication with relatives, friends, and colleagues located in other countries. On average across the seven countries in which a question was included about the presence of close personal connections with whom communication is maintained, 60% of those surveyed indicate that they have such connections in countries of the post-Soviet space.
(last year, this figure was 59% for nine countries, i.e., it remains virtually unchanged). This is evidence of the presence of significant social integration in the CIS region, which is an important precondition for the progress of Eurasian integration.

In four countries — Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Moldova — more than half of the adult population maintains communication with some kind of “correspondent”
in other countries. The same is true in Kazakhstan and Belarus for about half of the adult population. Moreover, in Tajikistan, unlike other countries, the percentage of respondents with connections in countries of the post-Soviet space has decreased (see Figure 4.3).

Among the EU countries with which residents of the post-Soviet space maintain continuous connections, we should make specific mention of the following:

- The residents of Moldova maintain close communication primarily with correspondents in Romania and Italy (for three years, these measurements have totalled more than 42%) and Germany (17%).
- Residents of Armenia communicate most often with acquaintances in France (12%).
- The residents of Kazakhstan interact with residents of Germany (11%).
Armenia has a far-reaching communications “diaspora” that goes beyond the post-Soviet space and Europe. One in five residents over the age of 18 maintains contact with residents in the United States (19% of those surveyed). Citizens of Moldova also have a large number of contacts with people in the United States (11%).

Within the CIS region, the strongest ties with Russia are expressed by Armenia (81% of respondents maintain contact with friends and colleagues in Russia), Kyrgyzstan (69%), and Tajikistan (65%). After declining in 2015, communication with Ukraine remains at the same level (Figure 4.4).

Belarus and Kazakhstan see a small decline in the percentage of the population maintaining regular communication with relatives, friends, and acquaintances in Russia. As always, residents of the Central Asian subregion are distinguished by their mutual ties.

Based on the survey results, the most “autonomous” countries — that is, countries with the lowest level of people involved in communication with the residents of any of the other countries — are Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. In contrast to these countries, only 1 in 10 adults in Armenia does not maintain regular communication outside the country. Tajikistan continues to see a sharp rise in the share of “autonomists.” In Moldova, the level remains essentially unchanged. The opposite trend (a decreasing level of economy) can be seen in Kyrgyzstan.

4.3. Personal experience visiting other countries

The next two indicators of countries’ sociocultural attraction — indicators of the real and potential cross-border mobility of the population of the post-Soviet space — largely characterize the population’s actual human interests and the level of their realization.

On average, across the countries participating in the project, 40% of the population declare that over the past five years they have visited at least one country within the CIS region. This indicator is approximately the same in Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Belarus, and Tajikistan, where roughly one in two respondents have visited states of the post-Soviet space. The lowest level of cross-border mobility toward the CIS region is registered in Russia (18%).

In Moldova, roughly one in five residents older than 18 has visited at least one European Union country (Romania, in most cases) in the last five years. This is a consistently and noticeably higher figure than for other countries participating in the project. Compared to other countries, Belarus also registers a rather high figure for visits to EU countries (15%).

The most autonomous countries with regard to this question are Russia (72%), Armenia, and the countries of the Central Asian subregion (not less than 53%).

Within the post-Soviet space, the main target of cross-border mobility is Russia. The Russian Federation was the destination for the largest share of visits from nearly all countries, while Ukraine was the main destination for Belarus, Moldova, and Russia (Figure 4.5). Compared with last year, the percentage of visits to Ukraine decreased only among residents of Belarus. The Central Asian subregion is also characterized by mutual attraction vectors.
Figure 4.5. Which of the listed countries have you visited in the last 5 years for personal, business, or tourism purposes? (Responses grouped by four attraction vectors)
4.4. Educational attractiveness of other countries

An important indicator of sociocultural closeness between countries that is used in this research is the desire to obtain a foreign education either personally or to give to one’s children. As has been seen in previous waves of the EDB Integration Barometer, for this indicator the territory of the post-Soviet space does not possess any special competitive advantages over the European Union or the most frequently mentioned countries of the rest of the world (see Figure 4.7).

The highest level of educational interest in the CIS countries cluster is seen in Tajikistan (56%). It is worth mentioning that this is the only country where the combined response relative to this cluster is statistically significantly greater than the share of responses attributed to each of the other categories. For the past two years, interest in an education within the post-Soviet space has been rising in Kazakhstan.
In terms of obtaining an education, respondents in Armenia and Moldova name European Union countries as preferable more often than others. According to the population of Armenia, the most popular countries are Great Britain, Germany, and France, while in Moldova the most popular country is Romania.
In 2015, Russia’s orientation toward *European Union* countries as preferred destinations for receiving an education decreases significantly (from 46% to 25%). This year, the indicator remains at the same level (23%). In Moldova and Tajikistan, this indicator is fluctuating.

More than others, the residents of Kyrgyzstan express preferences outside the *CIS region* and the *European Union*. This is true in Tajikistan, but there the educational interest in the “Other countries” cluster continues its consistent decline.

Among specific countries outside the *post-Soviet space*, residents of Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan would prefer to receive an education in the *United States*, while Russians and Belarusians prefer *Great Britain* and *Germany*. Residents of Kyrgyzstan demonstrate interest in obtaining an education in *Turkey*, and residents of Tajikistan express such interest in *China* (see Figure 4.8).
On average across the countries, roughly one-third of the population is not considering any international education option (neither for themselves or their children). The highest percentages of educational “autonomists” are found in Russia (70%) and Belarus (58%), while the lowest level is seen in Tajikistan (16%).

In general, if you do not count Russia, the post-Soviet space is not overly attractive as a general location for receiving an education. The percentage of mentions of the other countries of the CIS region does not exceed 7%. Over the past year, the attractiveness of obtaining an education in Russia has increased somewhat in Kyrgyzstan, and a positive trend is seen in Kazakhstan.

4.5. Tourist orientations and interests

The structure of desired tourist migration destinations differs significantly from the structure of actual travel (see Figure 4.5). On average, the share of mentions of CIS countries as actual tourist destinations is higher than the share of mentions of countries of the rest of the world and the European Union (see Figure 4.9). But CIS countries are the most attractive destinations for a hypothetical tourist trip only for residents of Tajikistan (50%). In this case, we can naturally assume that this desire is not merely (and not mainly) pure “tourism.”

More often than others, residents of Armenia (47%) indicate their desire to travel to a European Union country. The determination to visit countries of the European Union is consistently quite high in Moldova (43%). For Moldovans, the main object of attraction within the European Union is Romania. In 2016 in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the percentage of respondents desiring to visit countries of Europe has decreased somewhat.

A desire to visit any of the countries of the rest of the world is typical for approximately half or more of the residents of Kyrgyzstan (the indicator’s highest value). Russia and Kazakhstan see a decrease in interest in this destination. In Moldova, the desire to visit any of the countries of the rest of the world is the lowest among all of the countries participating in the project. In Armenia, interest in travelling to other countries is on the rise.

Within the post-Soviet space, the lines of attraction follow the “traditional” arrangement, i.e. directed primarily toward Russia (see Figure 4.10). Residents of Tajikistan express the greatest interest in Russia (37%, though this is less than in 2015). However, the most desired country to visit remains France. Among the residents of Armenia, Russia, and Belarus, this destination is the most attractive of all. Residents of Russia would also like to visit Germany (19%). This year, all countries participating in the project experience an expected decrease in their interest in travelling to Turkey.

The highest percentage of people who do not want to travel anywhere is seen in Russia and Belarus (more than one-third of the adult population); the country with the lowest level Tajikistan.
### Interest in countries of the CIS region:

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### No interest in any country clusters (“autonomy”):

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Figure 4.9. Please indicate which of the listed countries you would like to travel to for vacation or tourism purposes. (Responses grouped by four attraction vectors)
4.6. Interest in the artwork and cultural products of other countries

Interest in the culture of other countries is also manifested through interest in importing the creative services and products of these countries (inviting actors, reading books, listening to music). The majority of the surveyed residents of the countries of the post-Soviet space most often name countries in this same space as such sources of preferred products, i.e., they show an interest in inviting the cultural figures and consuming the cultural products of the countries of the CIS region (Figure 4.11).

This interest vector is most characteristic of the residents of Tajikistan and least characteristic of the residents of Russia, Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine (for the latter two countries, based on data from the previous wave). As compared with last year, Moldova sees a statistically significant decrease in interest in cultural interaction with CIS countries (from 63% to 52%).
However, the residents of Moldova show similarly decreased interest in European Union countries and the “Other countries” cluster, while the percentage of “autonomists” has increased.

Despite a 9 pp drop in the indicator, the populations of Moldova, Armenia, and Belarus have, more than others, been consistently interested in “importing culture” from...
European Union countries. Last year, Tajikistan see an increase in such interest, but this is most likely a random fluctuation. Residents of Moldova most frequently mention Romania while residents of Armenia, Russia and Belarus mention France and Germany most often. The residents of Tajikistan are more oriented toward the countries of the rest of the world, but this is the result of a sharp rise in interest this year. Residents of Kazakhstan have exhibited a gradual rise in interest in this cluster. Residents of Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Russia have manifested consistent interest in the countries of the “rest of the world” cluster. We should point out Kyrgyzstan’s relatively high demand for artistic works from Turkey and the increase in Tajikistan’s interest in Indian culture.

Overall, for the seven countries participating in the 2016 survey, the most attractive “exporter” of actors, authors, artists, cultural works, and works of art remains Russia (see Figure 4.12). Respondents in Belarus and Tajikistan show the greatest affinity for
for Russian culture: more than half of residents in these countries select Russia. However, the percentage of respondents inclined toward Russia with respect to this question has decreased in all other countries over the last year.

The country with the highest combined percentage of “None” and “It’s hard to say” responses is Russia, where this indicator increased; Armenia comes next at nearly the same level. This indicator is seen to increase in Kazakhstan and Moldova. Belarus’ level of “cultural autonomy” remains stable.

### 4.7. Tourist-exchange preferences

In the context of measuring the sociocultural distance/closeness between countries, along with determining the level of interest in visiting another country, it is important to clarify the level of willingness to receive guests from other countries (which was captured in the EDB Integration Barometer questionnaire with the following question: “Tourists arriving from which countries would be desirable in our country?”).

The attractiveness of an influx of tourists is notable for all three of the geopolitical clusters: the CIS region is mentioned on average by 55% of residents of the countries participating in the project, which is essentially the same as the mentions of the “European Union countries” cluster (51%). The “rest of the world” cluster receives 43% on average. In Figure 4.13, you can see the choice between the various clusters based on country. Close examination reveals the following differences:

- Tajikistan and Belarus have the highest orientation toward an influx of tourists from countries of the post-Soviet space.
- Moldova and Armenia (and Georgia, based on 2015 data) have above-average willingness to receive tourists from European Union countries.
- Residents of Kyrgyzstan are oriented toward tourists from the “rest of the world” more than others but on the same level as the “CIS region” cluster. For residents of Armenia, the United States is undoubtedly the top choice in this cluster. As compared with last year, residents of Tajikistan experience a sharp rise in interest in tourists from the “rest of the world.” By contrast, residents of Moldova show reduced interest in tourists from that cluster.
- Within the post-Soviet space, the most desirable tourists on average are Russians and, to a lesser degree, residents of Ukraine. Belarus names Russia most often as a desirable source of tourists. A rather high percentage of respondents who mention Russia comes from Tajikistan, despite the indicator’s fluctuations, and Moldova.
- Residents of the post-Soviet space declare the greatest interest in tourists from Germany and slightly less interest in tourists from France, Great Britain, and the United States. Residents of Moldova prove to be the most open to an influx of tourists into their country. In addition to all of the aforementioned countries, they would also like to see tourists from other European Union countries (51%, primarily Romania) and the United States (27%).
- On average across the countries, the percentage of respondents who would not like to see any such “guests” in their country is 18–20%.
Figure 4.13. Tourists arriving from which countries would be desirable in our country? (Responses grouped by four attraction vectors)

Interest in countries of the CIS region:

Interest in countries of the European Union:

Interest in “other countries”:

No interest in any country clusters (“autonomy”):

Note: in 2015–2016, this question was not asked in Russia and Kazakhstan.
Figure 4.14. Tourists arriving from which countries would be desirable in our country? (Top 3 in each country on average for 2014–2016)
5. Generalized “attraction” indicators (integration preferences) in composite indices

Individual indicators of the attractiveness of various countries in public consciousness (and the dynamics of these indicators) undoubtedly give an abundance of food for thought to specialists in various fields of politics, economics, and culture. Additionally, it is always helpful to generalize various aspects of integration preferences in composite indices that indicate general trends of public sentiment.

To present a generalized view of the integration preferences of the populations of countries participating in the monitoring, the EDB Integration Barometer considers several groups of indices that reflect the strength of these countries’ “attraction” to other countries and thus characterize the integration potential of the countries of the post-Soviet space at humanitarian standards.

5.1. How the indices are built

When building the indices, we considered only questions that assume a dichotomous (multiple) choice among countries or groups of countries from the list, and of these only questions that were asked in all the countries that participated at least in one of the last two waves of the EDB Integration Barometer. Table 5.1 presents a list of 12 such questions classified by domain. Hereinafter in the text, these questions are called general (or “supporting”) questions.

Two types of indices were computed based on the aforementioned questions:

- **Country category of attraction indices** — an indication of a country’s attraction to one of the geopolitical clusters: to countries of the CIS region, European Union countries or “other countries.”

- **Mutual attraction indices** — indicators of the mutual attraction between each pair (dyad) of countries in the post-Soviet space.

For each type of index, we first created special attraction indices that characterize attraction in the various areas — political, economic, and sociocultural. We then used the special attraction indices to calculate general attraction indices.

The procedures for building the attraction indices (for both “category” and “mutual” attraction) are given in the Analytical Report on the results of the fourth wave of the EDB Integration Barometer (see section 4)\(^{17}\). They were not changed in the fifth wave.

5.2. CIS region countries’ attraction indices relative to various country categories

The numerical values of the post-Soviet space countries’ attraction indices relating to the various geopolitical clusters based on the results of the latest wave of the EDB Integration Barometer are given in Figure 5.1.

5. GENERALIZED “ATTRACTION” INDICATORS (INTEGRATION PREFERENCES) IN COMPOSITE INDICES

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<th>Wording of the question</th>
<th>Area</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>T1</td>
<td>In your opinion, which of the countries listed on the form are friends to our country (i.e., countries we can rely on for help in an hour of need)?</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>T3</td>
<td>Regarding military and political aid (weapons, military contingent, political support at the international level, etc.), to which of these countries would our country render such aid?</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>T6</td>
<td>In which of the listed countries do you have relatives, close friends, and colleagues with whom you maintain constant communication (in person, by mail, phone, etc.)?</td>
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<td>T7</td>
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<td>Please indicate which of the listed countries you would like to travel to for vacation or tourism purposes.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>T9</td>
<td>FOR RESPONDENTS UP TO 35 YEARS OLD. Please indicate which of the listed countries you would like to travel to for studies. FOR RESPONDENTS 35 YEARS AND OLDER. Which of the listed countries would you like to send your children to for studies?</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>T12</td>
<td>In your opinion, from which countries do we need to invite into our country more actors, writers, and artists, and buy and translate books, movies, musical productions, and other cultural works?</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>T10</td>
<td>In which countries (of those listed on the form) would you like to temporarily work if you had the opportunity?</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>T14</td>
<td>From which countries would you welcome temporary and permanent workers, students, and specialists to come into our country for work and studies?</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>T15</td>
<td>From which countries would it be desirable for our country to receive capital, investments, and an influx of companies, entrepreneurs, and businessmen to set up their firms among us?</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>T16</td>
<td>With which countries would it be beneficial to our government and business to engage in scientific and technological cooperation, conduct joint research, and exchange developments, technologies, and scientific ideas?</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>T17</td>
<td>Which countries’ products do you prefer to buy and trust the most?</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recall that in 2012–2014 (see report for the corresponding waves of the EDB Integration Barometer), only nine “general” questions were used to build the indices. In 2015, the decision was made to recalculate the indices based on the addition of three questions, characterizing sociocultural interaction, to the analysis (T6, T8, T12). However, not all five sociocultural questions (T6–T9, T12) have regularly been included in the surveys in various countries (in all four previous waves of the EDB IB). See the explanations later in the text.
The special attraction indices for individual topics have been converted to **general attraction indices** for country clusters. Figure 5.1. shows the values of the general attraction indices, similar to how it was done for the individual questions in sections 2–4 of this report.
The changes over the last year are small for most countries (except for Armenia), but the gradual accumulation of these changes will lead to a fundamental shift in the countries’ positions in sociocultural preferences.

As we can see, considering all three factors — political, economic, and cultural — for a relative majority of countries participating in the 2016 survey, the top attraction vector is directed toward the post-Soviet space, with the political factor being key to this alignment. Based on the 2016 survey, the populations of four EAEU member states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) and the candidate for membership in this union (Tajikistan) are predominantly oriented toward the post-Soviet space.

According to 2015 data, Ukraine preserves its increased share of orientations toward European Union countries while maintaining highly diverse geopolitical orientations and a high level of preference for autonomy.

The integration positions of Russia, Georgia, and Moldova are essentially undefined and have multiple orientations. These countries belong to a zone of uncertainty, though Georgia and Moldova maintain a slight preference for the European Union, while Russia leans toward the CIS region and the countries of the “rest of the world” (China, in particular).

We must also note the high level of preferences for autonomy, which are characteristic of the populations of Russia and Ukraine and have grown significantly over the last year in Moldova and Armenia.

In Table 5.2, countries are grouped based on their preferred geopolitical vectors in accordance with our calculation of general attraction indices.

Despite the relative stability of the geopolitical positioning of the countries in the past two years, we should point out the unstable attitudes in Armenia and Russia: Armenia is increasingly becoming “multi-vectorized”, while Russia, conversely, has recently become more oriented toward the CIS region.
5.3. Mutual attraction indices

Table 5.3 presents the unbalanced (original) mutual attraction indices of post-Soviet space countries, which were computed following the algorithm outlined in Chapter 5.1. To minimize the influence of sudden changes in the indicators and to properly compare all the analysed countries, the indicator values have been averaged over 2015–2016. The table shows which countries of the post-Soviet space were chosen most often as preferred (attractive) in all other countries participating in the EDB Integration Barometer. Table 5.4 presents the difference between the average mutual attraction indices from 2012–2013 and 2015–2016. Clearly, in Belarus, Russia, and part of Kazakhstan, the average percentage of mentions of post-Soviet space countries as attractive has grown with respect to the aggregate indicator. In other words, we can say that in these countries in recent years the population has become more oriented toward the countries of the CIS region (except Ukraine), and more frequently sees specifically these countries as geopolitical friends and economic partners (for Ukraine, the situation is the opposite in all three EAEU “founding” countries). By contrast, Armenia has shown a small but negative trend. Georgia and Moldova demonstrate relative stability. In Ukraine preferences continue to be reevaluated (a sharp drop in attraction to Russia and a notable rise in attraction to Georgia).

Table 5.3. Original mutual attraction indicators in 2015–2016 (average shares of countries' mentions in the 12 "general" questions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mentioned country</th>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Belarus</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 The data are presented by columns, i.e., along the vertical we have the weighted average percentages of the row-countries' mentions in the column-country.
### Table 5.4. Changes in the original mutual attraction indicators between 2012–2013 and 2015–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surveyed country</th>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Belarus</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>−2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>−3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>−2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>−2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>−1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>−3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>−1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>−1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>−2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>−1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>−6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>−2%</td>
<td>−7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>−20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>−1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>−1%</td>
<td>−1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>−1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>−3%</td>
<td>−6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>−4%</td>
<td>−2%</td>
<td>−6%</td>
<td>−7%</td>
<td>−1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Differentiation of the integration sentiment of population groups with different levels of wealth

In each country participating in the EDB Integration Barometer, the questionnaire included a block of questions to ascertain the sociodemographic characteristics of respondents: gender, age, education, employment type, settlement type, self-assessment of the family’s wealth (economic status) and consumer status. This section presents an analysis of the differences in integration preferences depending on the respondent’s self-assessments of his/her family’s wealth and consumer status.

It presents information on how integration sentiments change depending on the self-assessment of the family’s wealth. Moreover, we use only those parameters that exhibit similar trends of differentiation based on the respondent’s self-assessment of both the family’s wealth and consumer status\(^\text{19}\).

6.1. Political integration

An important marker of public attitudes toward political integration is its perception that a country is friendly or unfriendly. Table 6.1 shows the differences in how countries are perceived as friendly or unfriendly among various groups of respondents separated based on their self-assessments of economic position. The shares of “None” responses are presented.

We note that a lack of a feeling of friendliness from other countries is more often declared among the low-income segments of the population — in a number of countries, these differences are more noticeable (Armenia, Belarus, Russia, Tajikistan) than in others (Moldova). Presumably, this is linked to the low-income groups’ reduced social status and, consequently, to a negative attitude toward other entities (in particular, other countries). These patterns persist in groups built based on consumer status.

As for perceptions of the unfriendliness of countries, patterns are not the same in different countries. For example, in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, the wealthy layers of society are more likely than the poor to assert the absence of countries unfriendly to their states. But in Moldova and Tajikistan, the poor are more likely to state that their country does not have “enemy states.”

As for the perception of specific countries, general trends could not be seen here either. We will point out the most curious observations. In Russia, the wealthy and citizens with a high consumer status are generally more likely than those who rate their economic position as “poor” to consider several countries friendly.

Differences in the perception of EU countries based on material position in consumer status are most pronounced in Moldova, which, though not a full member of the EU,

\(^{19}\) Please note that in this section, the terms “high-income groups”, “materially wealthy categories”, “respondents with high wealth and consumer status”, and “wealthy categories” are used synonymously.
6. DIFFERENTIATION OF THE INTEGRATION SENTIMENT OF POPULATION GROUPS WITH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF WEALTH

has leadership and elites actively working to this end. In Moldova, the materially disadvantaged segments of society were noticeably less likely than the wealthy to refer to Great Britain, Germany, France, and “other EU countries” as friendly.

The most striking income-dependent differences in the perception of specific countries as threatening, according to the surveys, are observed in Kazakhstan. In general, representatives of high-income groups quite rarely call countries unfriendly (with the exception of China). At the same time, low-income citizens of Kazakhstan more actively identify “threatening countries.” For example, Ukraine is designated so by nearly half (47%) of respondents who rated their family’s economic position as poor; the United States 37%, and Turkey 17%.

Thus, we may say we have seen that immigration preferences in the political domain do depend on citizens’ level of income, but the rules governing these relationships are not uniform in the different countries. Nevertheless, we note that high-income categories of the population, despite the few exceptions noted above, are generally less inclined than low-income groups of citizens to see other countries in a hostile light.

6.2. Economic integration

To analyse differences in integration preferences, based on income level, four questions were chosen: the possibility of temporary employment in another country, taking up permanent residence in another country, desirability of an influx of workers and capital, and attitudes about purchasing goods from other countries.

Because income-dependent differentiation was not observed or was only weakly observed related to most of the candidate countries for relocation for temporary employment, Table 6.2 shows data for only certain countries (Germany and the United States) and the “None” option where differences were seen (including based on consumer status).

We state at the outset that with respect to temporary employment in Russia, the survey data support neither consistent income-dependent differentiation nor general patterns in the different countries participating in the project.

At first glance, the general case is that, in many countries, low-income citizens are noticeably more likely to choose the “None” option, i.e., they do not even consider it possible that they might work in other countries (Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan). However, this pattern is not seen in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
By contrast, high-income citizens are more likely than the poor to express the desire to work in the United States or Germany. This is evident in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Russia. But in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, there were no differences between income groups.

With respect to the question of moving to another country for permanent residence, we do not detect serious differences between income groups or general trends (except for certain directions of movement into specific countries). This also applies to the “None” option. In Armenia, Moldova, Russia, and Tajikistan, this option is chosen more often by low-income groups than by high-income groups, but in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan it was chosen less often.

A similar situation is seen in the question about the desirability of an influx of capital, investments, companies, entrepreneurs, and businessmen into the country. The income-dependent differentiation observed in the countries participating in the project and with respect to the prospective investor countries is highly diverse. In Belarus, high-income citizens somewhat less frequently then the poor express a desire for an influx of capital from Great Britain, Germany, France, and other EU countries. In Moldova, the situation is reversed — the higher the self-assessment of the family’s economic position and consumer status, the more likely an inflow of investment in capital from EU countries is viewed positively.

Finally, one additional parameter reflects the economic integration preferences of residents of post-Soviet space countries through a question on desirable sources of labour resources. As an example, Table 6.3 presents data for two objects of interest (Germany and “Countries of the Arab/Islamic world”) and the “None” option.

Overall, we may say that income-dependent differentiation in the various countries and with respect to the various countries is not identical, and it would probably not be valid to speak of general trends. In Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Russia, we can see differences between income groups with respect to the arrival of workers from Germany, but in Belarus the poor are inclined to prefer labour resources from Germany more often than the wealthy. In the three other countries, the opposite is true. The differentiation between income groups with respect to countries of the Arab/Islamic world looks just the opposite in Kyrgyzstan (the wealthy are in favour more often) and Tajikistan (the poor are in favour more often).
With respect to labour resources from Russia, income-dependent differentiation is inconsistent, and no well-pronounced patterns have been detected.

The “None” option, which reflects the desire to not receive foreign labour resources into one’s country, is chosen more often by low-income segments of the population in a number of countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan), while in other countries the opposite is true — the high-income groups are more likely to choose this option (Armenia, Kyrgyzstan).

Thus, we may summarize that economic integration sentiment undoubtedly depends on the income category of the respondent. However, we have not observed any regular patterns that apply to all countries regarding how membership in any particular income group determines attitudes toward economic integration.

### 6.3. Sociocultural integration

An important indicator of sociocultural integration sentiment is attitudes toward travel for educational purposes for oneself or one’s children. Among the block of questions about sociocultural integration, this question proves to be essentially the only one that demonstrates some differentiation across groups with different levels of material wealth.

With respect to receiving an education in countries of the CIS region, except Russia, there is virtually no differentiation of opinions in the different income groups. When it comes to choosing Russia to obtain an education, differences between income groups are observed only in Belarus and Kazakhstan: in Belarus, this choice is made more often by respondents from high-income groups, while in Kazakhstan, by contrast, it is chosen more often by the poor.

When it comes to choosing other countries (Table 6.4 presents examples relative to Germany and the United States), observed trends also vary in different countries.

On the one hand, in some countries (Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Russia), the wealthy segments of the population are largely oriented toward an education in Germany or the United States (which seems obvious, simply due to objective opportunities). But in other countries, this relationship is not seen.
The level of “cultural autonomy” (choosing the “None” option) with respect to travel for educational purposes is generally higher among citizens with low material wealth and consumer status.

We note that also for other questions of sociocultural integration, income-dependent differentiation in various countries is frequently highly dissimilar and even oppositely oriented, and no general trends have been detected. In several countries, differentiation is entirely absent, while we do see it in other countries.

### 6.4. Attitudes toward the Eurasian Economic Union

An analysis of the distribution of answers from respondents in countries participating in the project regarding their attitudes toward the EAEU as a function of respondents’ income level (based on both indicators) demonstrates that, despite the differences between countries, several similar patterns can be identified. In most countries (Kyrgyzstan is an exception), those who are better off in terms of economic well-being are more likely to have a positive attitude toward the Union than the less well off (Table 6.5). We can also see that low-income groups of citizens are relatively more likely than high-income earners to state their indifference or even negative attitude toward the EAEU. This conclusion does not apply to Russia, where there is virtually no differentiation in attitudes toward the Union in groups with different economic positions.

As part of the 2016 survey of the populations of EAEU member states, questions were asked regarding the introduction of a common currency, the creation of a common television broadcasting company, the authorization of citizens’ free movement, an expansion of the Union, and the conclusion of an agreement on free trade and investments between the EAEU and the EU. Income-dependent differences of opinion are seen with respect to these questions in the various countries, but general patterns for the entire set of countries are essentially not observed. The only similarity we can make note of in the results is the fact that, in terms of the percentage of respondents with favourable attitudes toward the creation of a common television broadcasting company for EAEU member states, differences between groups with different levels of income are small in all countries (Table 6.6).
We make note of the following country-specific features regarding the various areas for future development of the Union. In Belarus, across all of the questions, high-income categories vote “For” more often than low-income earners. In Russia and Armenia, a difference between the wealthy and the poor is seen only in the questions about a common currency and the introduction of free trade between EAEU countries and the EU. Moreover, in Russia, high-income earners are supportive of both measures more often than low-income earners. In Armenia, citizens with low incomes are more likely to welcome the introduction of a common currency. In Kyrgyzstan, the relatively better off are more likely to be in favour of free movement of the citizens of EAEU member states within the Union, while in Kazakhstan the opposite is true: the poor are more supportive of this measure.

Regarding perceptions about the prospects of integration processes (whether the CIS countries will converge or move apart), in Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan the opinion that the countries will converge is expressed more often by high-income segments of the population than by low-income segments. However, in Belarus, Russia, and Moldova, opinions so not consistently depend on the respondents’ economic positions (based on an analysis of two parameters: economic position and consumer status).

In turn, low-income segments of the population are more likely than high-income segments to not expect changes (as in Belarus) or to even predict that the countries will move farther away from one another (as in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan). As noted previously, the percentages of citizens in Armenia who are optimistic about the process of integration are small, and there are no income-dependent differences. Moreover, among the poor residents of Armenia, there is an extremely high percentage of people who find it difficult to rate integration prospects.

Thus, on the one hand, the high-income segments of the population of various countries are generally more likely to have favourable attitudes toward the EAEU than low-income citizens. However, with respect to questions of areas for the future development of the Union, as well as the prospects of integration processes, no general patterns are detected: in different countries, income-dependent differentiation is noted on a case-by-case basis.
Table 6.6. Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia have joined together in the Eurasian Economic Union and are discussing further joint actions. What is your attitude toward each of the following potential actions? Are you “For” or “Against”...
(Shares of “For” responses, grouped by population segments with different levels of income)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Belarus</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... the introduction of a common currency in the EAEU countries</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the introduction of a common currency in the EAEU countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the introduction of a common currency in the EAEU countries</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the creation of a common television broadcasting company for EAEU member states</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the creation of a common television broadcasting company for EAEU member states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the creation of a common television broadcasting company for EAEU member states</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the creation of a common television broadcasting company for EAEU member states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the authorization of EAEU member states’ citizens’ free movement within the Union with the opportunity to take up residence, work, study, and conduct business anywhere in EAEU countries</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the authorization of EAEU member states’ citizens’ free movement within the Union with the opportunity to take up residence, work, study, and conduct business anywhere in EAEU countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... an expansion of the EAEU through other countries’ accession to the Union</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... an expansion of the EAEU through other countries’ accession to the Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the conclusion of an agreement on free trade and investments between EAEU countries and the European Union</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the conclusion of an agreement on free trade and investments between EAEU countries and the European Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Findings and general conclusion

1. The surveys of the population of the CIS countries, which were conducted as part of the fifth wave of the EDB Integration Barometer, have generally confirmed the general trends of integration sentiment and preferences of the citizens of countries participating in the project that were identified in the previous monitoring waves, as well as the geopolitical position of the citizens of these countries. Additionally, we have noted fluctuations in individual indicators in certain countries, caused by the unfavourable foreign-political context of the past three years. Serious ongoing conflicts between individual CIS countries (Russia–Ukraine, Armenia–Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Tajikistan) and on the borders of the region (Russia–Turkey), which at times also manifest themselves in armed conflict, are significantly increasing the tension in the information field, forming and reinforcing in the public mind the “face of the enemy”, and, of course, considerably influencing the public’s geopolitical sympathies/antipathies.

Through lengthy observation, we can see the gradual formation in the post-Soviet space of new alliances comprised of countries that complement one another ideologically. Moreover, according to public opinion, a rather large number of countries occupy an ambiguous (divided) position relative to integration preference vectors, which creates certain risk for integration processes (including the process of forming and developing the EAEU).

2. Overall, public opinion toward the EAEU in the seven countries that participated in the 2016 monitoring may be characterized as positive. In any event, favourable assessments are characteristic of the majority of the population of these countries. Armenia is the exception, where less than half of respondents express positive attitudes toward the EAEU. Moreover, in 2016, the level of positive attitudes toward the organization slightly (within the “margin of error”) decreases in all countries where the survey was conducted, except Belarus and Moldova. In Armenia, attitudes have become less positive. This trend has been seen consistently since 2014.

Citizens’ positions relative to nearly all proposed, future joint actions by the EAEU member states — introduction of a common currency, creation of a common television broadcasting company, authorization of citizens’ free movement, expansion of the Union, and conclusion of an agreement on free trade and investments between the EAEU and the EU — may also generally be considered to be quite positive. The proposed actions are supported by a majority of the populations of all of the countries (except for the introduction of a common currency in Armenia and Belarus where opinions are split).

Residents of countries of the Central Asian subregion are most optimistic about the prospects of integration processes. In Russia, Belarus, and Moldova, the number of “integration optimists” is less impressive. They do not comprise a dominant group, but there are noticeably more of them than sceptics. Moreover, in Moldova, we can see a statistically significant positive trend in this indicator.
Ukraine, where since 2014 the share of respondents who believe that CIS countries will increasingly move apart exceed the share of respondents who have the opposite view, is joined by Armenia in 2016.

A comparative analysis reveals a difference in the views on the development of integration processes between the citizens of the “old” EU and the “young” EAEU. Respondents from EAEU countries are as yet more optimistic and desirous to expand integration and ties with other countries, while EU countries are seeing growing scepticism for interstate integration.

3. The interstate conflicts indicated above influence public perceptions of the prospects of political integration (military and political cooperation). On the one hand, EAEU countries, Tajikistan, and, to a certain degree, Moldova continue to perceive one another as friendly countries with prospects of political unions, and the populations of the mentioned countries are largely oriented towards political unions within the post-Soviet space. On the other hand, since 2013, practically all CIS countries have experienced a manyfold reduction in the number of respondents who perceive Ukraine as a “friendly” country. Only Georgian (and some Belarusian) respondents continue to consider Ukraine a friendly country. Ukraine and Georgia (and, to a certain degree, a divided Moldova) are forming a new cluster of CIS countries that is largely oriented toward the European Union.

Today, we can say that the prolonged Russian–Ukrainian conflict and the associated changes in respondents’ attitudes toward the EU and the United States are beginning to also affect public opinion in other CIS countries with respect to the conflict’s participants. The multiplication of bipolar conflicts between certain CIS countries is clearly affecting perceptions of integration prospects throughout the region and encouraging countries to reconsider potential allies. In Moldova and Armenia, we can see a trend toward political “autonomy.”

We should especially make note of the significant negative trend seen in 2015–2016 in Armenian respondents’ attitude toward CIS countries (and Russia), which is obviously associated with the escalation of the Armenian–Azerbaijan conflict in the spring of 2016 and with dissatisfaction (on the part of the Armenian public) with the position in this conflict taken by Russia, CSTO, and the CIS as a whole.

4. Overall, the 2016 economic attraction indicators demonstrate the trends noted in the previous waves of the project. However, Russia, which holds leading positions in the rankings in terms of number of mentions as a desirable supplier of financial, scientific and technological, and labour resources, has begun to lose its popularity as a source of immigrants.

Among the major trends in the economic attraction block, we may point out the following:

- Russia’s position in the countries of the Central Asian subregion has weakened, and there is a particularly notable decline in Tajikistan relative to aspects of potential migration, acceptance of immigrants, and the attractiveness of Russian financial resources and business. Among the population of Kazakhstan, the popularity of Russian goods has fallen, as well as the demand for students and specialists from Russia,
and the percentage of respondents in support of business and scientific cooperation with Russia has decreased.

- Amid the decline in Russia’s rating in Tajikistan, residents’ preferences have reoriented themselves toward cooperation with the countries of the “rest of the world” through an increase in the attractiveness of China as source of foreign investment, and as a partner in scientific and technological cooperation.

- The 2016 way establishes the distinguishing characteristic of the population of Armenia who, with respect to economic questions, is equally split toward integration with the countries of the three geopolitical blocs — CIS countries, European Union countries, and Rest of the world.

In general, we can say that the citizens of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are most often inclined to consider economic integration with CIS countries. Moldova and (based on 2015 data) Ukraine and Georgia prefer economic cooperation with the European Union. In the past two years, Russians have reoriented themselves somewhat from the European countries to the Eastern countries, but the European orientations have maintained their positions. Finally, citizens of Armenia and Belarus demonstrate a plurality of opinions, among which orientations are equally split toward economic attraction to all three geo-economic country clusters.

5. Diverse answers are typical for respondents in the area of sociocultural interaction and biases. Multi-vectored integration preferences are evident in these questions in the majority of countries. However, we can state the following regular patterns:

- The entire Central Asian subregion — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and especially Tajikistan — exhibit a somewhat increased preference for the culture of the post-Soviet space.

- An orientation toward the European Union is present in Moldova, though the country also has a large percentage of respondents oriented toward sociocultural interaction with the CIS region.

- Finally, in the sociocultural sphere, the populations of Armenia, Belarus, and Russia (EAEU member states) show a remarkable diversity of preferences (expressing equal sympathies for countries of the CIS region, the European Union, and the “rest of the world”) and an elevated level of orientation toward autonomy.

The changes over the past year have been small for the surveyed countries.

6. In general, considering all three factors of humanitarian attraction — political, economic, and cultural — for a relative majority of countries participating in the 2016 survey, the top attraction vector is directed toward the post-Soviet space, with the political factor remaining key to this alignment. Based on the 2016 survey, the populations of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are predominantly oriented toward the post-Soviet space. Ukraine (based on 2015 data and external 2016 sources) maintains an increased percentage of orientations toward European Union countries, while also retaining highly diverse geopolitical orientations and a high level of preferences for “autonomy.”

The position on integration of Russia, Georgia, and Moldova is essentially undefined and has multiple orientations. These countries belong to a zone of uncertainty, though Georgia
and Moldova maintain a slight preference for the European Union, while Russia leans toward the CIS region and the countries of the “rest of the world” (China, in particular). We must also note the high level of preferences for autonomy that are characteristic of the populations of Russia and Ukraine and have grown significantly over the last year in Moldova and Armenia.

7. An analysis of how integration attitudes vary over the respondents’ different income levels reveals that, without exception, we can essentially discern no general patterns characteristic of all surveyed countries. We note that high-income categories of the population, despite a few exceptions, are generally less inclined than low-income groups of citizens to view other countries in a hostile light. But for other questions of integration (including economic and sociocultural), income-dependent differentiation in various countries is frequently highly dissimilar and even oppositely oriented.

Generally, the high-income segments of the population of various countries are more likely than low-income citizens to express positive attitudes toward the EAEU. However, with respect to individual questions of areas for the future development of the Union, as well as the prospects of integration processes, no general patterns are detected. For example, in Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the opinion that the countries will converge is expressed more often by high-income earners than by low-income earners. But this cannot be said of Belarus, Russia, and Moldova where we do not observe consistent income dependences.

Based on the entire body of data, we may tentatively conclude that a respondent’s material position is a source of competitiveness in the labour market and/or in business and attitudes toward various aspects of integration preferences, held by respondents with different levels of income, in various countries depend on whether these respondents perceive the aspect (for example, immigration of professionals and students from other countries) as diminishing or enhancing their competitiveness.
Appendix 1. Organization and administration of the surveys (field stage)

Mass representative surveys of the adult population in seven countries of the post-Soviet space were administered with the help of service providers that are experienced in conducting surveys in the indicated countries and recommended themselves well in the performance of previous waves of Eurasian Monitor (EM) and EDB Integration Barometer projects. The list of service providers involved in this EM wave (No. 25) is given in Table 1A.

We should note that the survey procedures for six of the seven countries were financed under an agreement between the Eurasian Development Bank (Customer) and International Research Agency Eurasian Monitor (Service Provider). Work in Moldova was performed using the internal funds of International Research Agency Eurasian Monitor. These Moldovan surveys are included in this report in accordance with a preliminary agreement between the Customer and Service Provider.

ANO Sociology Workshop Zadorina (ZIRCON Research Group, Moscow, Russia) developed the survey instrumentation (questionnaires), analysed the data, and prepared reports.

Eurasian Monitor gave the questionnaires to national service providers in the Russian language. The service provider independently arranged for the required translation of the questionnaire into the widely-spoken languages of the country (including the language of the titular nation).

The surveys of the populations of the countries participating in the project, which took the form of in-person structured interviews using the specified questionnaire for the respondent’s place of residence, were conducted in various countries in the period from 20 April to 30 June 2016 (See Table 2A).

To ensure that the survey is representative of the adult population (18 years and older) in each country, a sample set of the population of this country was created that corresponded to the results of the latest public census. The sample set for each country must represent the adult population in terms of gender, age, settlement type, and geographical location. The service providers are responsible to ensure that the sample is representative in accordance with the contract to perform field work.

The planned number of 1,050 questionnaires was established with a reserve for possible adjustment of the data set so that the number of questionnaires processed is at least 1,000 per country. This target was achieved in each surveyed country (See Table 2A).

The total number of questionnaires processed was 8,545.

According to the contracts with the national pollsters, the questionnaire for each country included between 16 and 20 questions from the suggested questionnaire, of which 16 were required and the remainder were “if possible.” Moreover, the pollsters included without compensation nine questions regarding the regular monitoring of social sentiment, which is being conducted under a Eurasian Monitor (EM) project.
### Table 1A. List of national pollsters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Regional (national) service provider</th>
<th>Partnership status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>MPG</td>
<td>Member of the EM Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Research Firm NOVAK</td>
<td>Member of the EM Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Centre for Social and Political Research STRATEGIYA</td>
<td>Member of the EM Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Centre for Public Opinion Research and Forecasting El-Pikir</td>
<td>Member of the EM Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Centre for Sociological Investigations and Marketing CBS-AXA</td>
<td>Member of the EM Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>ANO Sociology Workshop Zadorina (ZIRCON Group)</td>
<td>Member of the EM Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>OO Chashmandoz (formerly Korshinos)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2A. Key features of the national surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dates for field work</th>
<th>Number of questionnaires</th>
<th>Number of questionnaires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>13 May 2016 – 25 May 2016</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>1,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>10 May 2016 – 23 May 2016</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>1,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>15 May 2016 – 30 May 2016</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>31 May 2016 – 06 June 2016</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>16 June 2016 – 30 June 2016</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>1,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>20 April 2016 – 26 April 2016</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>17 May 2016 – 29 May 2016</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3A. Number of questions included in the questionnaires for the national surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of EM monitoring questions</th>
<th>Number of EDB IB questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3A presents information about the number of questions included in the questionnaires for the national surveys.

The conditions of the contracts with the national pollsters established the following requirements regarding monitoring of the data collection (surveys):

- **Complete (100%) visual inspection of the questionnaire.**
- **Random monitoring of the quality of mass phone surveys (40% of the total number of collected questionnaires for respondents with a phone number (mobile, work, home) on the route sheet. For respondents who for some reason did not provide a phone number (no phone/refused to provide), personal repeat visits (of 20% of the total number of collected questionnaires) were made in order to monitor each interviewer.**
- **Complete (100%) inspection of the database after the data had been entered.**

All contractors provided routing sheets electronically and control sheets with a report about the inspection performed.

The public survey data were entered by the contractors as they conducted the field work. At the conclusion of the surveys, the data sets were sent electronically to Eurasian Monitor. Then a combined data set was created, which was inspected in terms of data entry quality and prepared for further processing and analysis.

Thus, the field stage of the research (data collection) under EDB Integration Barometer 2016 was conducted in accordance with the Requirements Specifications, simultaneously in seven countries, and within the established timeframes.
The main goal of the project is to assess a macroeconomic effect of the creation of the Customs Union and Single Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and to determine prospects of the development of integration links between Ukraine and the CU. The project was conducted by the team of five research institutions. The results presented in the Report have been widely recognized and become standard. Available in Russian and English.

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Available in Russian and English.
2013

**Eurasian Integration: Challenges of Transcontinental Regionalism**
Evgeny Vinokurov, Alexander Libman
Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan

“Vinokurov and Libman have pulled together a tremendous range of information and insight about Eurasian economic integration. Their eminently readable book tackles an important and timely topic, which lies at the heart of global economic and political transformation in the 21st century.”
Johannes Linn, Brookings Institute
http://eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/monographsCIS/

**Holding-Together Regionalism: Twenty Years of Post-Soviet Integration**
Alexander Libman, Evgeny Vinokurov
Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan

An in-depth analysis of one of the most important and complex issues of the post-Soviet era, namely the (re-)integration of this highly interconnected region. The book considers the evolution of “holding-together” groups since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, looking at intergovernmental interaction and informal economic and social ties.
http://eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/monographsCIS/

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**EDB Integration Barometer — 2013**
The EDB Centre for Integration Studies in cooperation with the Eurasian Monitor International Research Agency examined the approaches of population to regional integration.
Available in Russian and English.
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/integration_barometer/

**Cross-Border Cooperation between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine**
Cooperation between 27 cross-border regions of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine has significant potential; however the existing frontiers and barriers are a significant factor that fragments the region’s economic space.
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/project16/

**Labour Migration and Human Capital of Kyrgyzstan: Impact of the Customs Union**
The report focuses on the effects of Kyrgyzstan’s possible accession to the Customs Union (CU) and Single Economic Space (SES) on the flows of labour resources, the volume of cash remittances, labour market conditions and professional education and training in this country.
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/labor_migration_kyrgyzstan_cu/

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**Monitoring of Mutual Investments in the CIS**
The report contains new results of the joint research project of the Centre for Integration Studies of EDB and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. It is aimed at the maintenance and development of the monitoring database of mutual direct investment in the CIS countries and Georgia. A general characteristic of mutual investments in the CIS at the end of 2012 is provided.
Available in Russian and English.
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/

**Customs Union and Ukraine: Economic and technological cooperation in sectors and industries**
The authors of the report study the issue of industrial and inter-industry links between the SES economies and Ukraine and come to a conclusion that cooperation between enterprises has been maintained in practically all segments of the processing industries, while in certain sectors of mechanical engineering this cooperation has no alternatives.
Available in Russian and English.
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/project18/
Report 23
Quantifying Economic Integration: of the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union: Methodological Approaches
The objective of the project is to discuss and analyse economic integration in Eurasia, both on the continental scale “from Lisbon to Shanghai”, and in the EU-EEU dimension “from Lisbon to Vladivostok.”
Available in Russian and English.
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/project21/

Report 24
Pension Mobility within the Eurasian Economic Union and the CIS
In the report the experts evaluate the prospects of implementing effective mechanisms in the region to tackle pension problems of migrant workers.
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/project24/

Report 25
EDB Integration Barometer — 2014
The results of the third research into preferences of the CIS region population with respect to various aspects of Eurasian integration suggest that the “integration core” of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) continues to form and crystallise.
Available in Russian and English.
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/integration_barometer/index.php?id_16=42460

Report 26
Monitoring of mutual CIS investments 2014
This is the fifth report on the results of the long-term research project devoted to monitoring of mutual direct investments in the CIS countries and Georgia. The current report provides detailed information on the scope and structure of mutual investments of CIS countries up to the end of 2013. The report provides information on the most important trends in the first half of 2014, including the situation in Ukraine and its impact on the Russian direct investments in the country. It also presents an analysis of the prospects for mutual direct investments of the Eurasian Economic Union countries.
Available in Russian and English.
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/invest_monitoring/index.php?id_16=42737

Report 19
Monitoring of direct investments of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine in Eurasia
The Eurasia FDI Monitoring project supplements another research by the EDB Centre for Integration Studies — Monitoring of Mutual Foreign Investment in the CIS Countries (CIS Mutual Investment Monitoring).
Available in Russian and English.
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/project19/

Report 20
Armenia and the Customs Union: Impact of Accession
This report provides the assessment of the macroeconomic impact of Armenia joining the Customs Union.
Available in Russian and English.
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/project20/

Report 27
EDB Regional Integration Database
This is an applied research project, which represents the creation of a specialized regularly updated database of the most significant regional integration organisations (RIOs) and economic/trade agreements of the world.
Available in Russian and English.
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/project26/

Report 28
Monitoring of direct investments of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in Eurasia — 2014
The second report presents new results of the permanent annual project dedicated to monitoring of direct investments of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine in Eurasia. On the basis of the statistics collected during monitoring, detailed information is provided on the dynamics, actual geographical location and sectoral structure of the investments.
Available in Russian and English.
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/project24/

System of Indicators of Eurasian Integration
The System of Indicators of Eurasian Integration (SIEI) is designed to become the monitoring and assessment tool for integration processes within the post-Soviet territory.
Available in Russian and English.
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/siei/index.php?id_16=37610
Report 29
An Assessment of the Economic Effects of Lifting Non-Tariff Barriers in the EEU
The EDB Centre for Integration Studies publishes the first comprehensive assessment of the effects of non-tariff barriers on mutual trade in the EEU and provides recommendations as to how to remove them. The report has been prepared by the Centre for Integration Studies based on a poll of 530 Russian, Kazakh and Belarusian exporters. Available in Russian and English. http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/index.php?id_4=47863&linked_block_id=0

Report 30
An Assessment of the Impact of Non-Tariff Barriers in the EEU: the Results of the Survey of Exporters
A large-scale poll of 530 enterprises in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia suggests that non-tariff barriers account 15% to 30% of the value of exports. Belarusian exporters estimate non-tariff barriers in their trade with Russia and Kazakhstan at 15% of the value of their exports, Kazakh exporters at 16% for exports to Russia and 29% for exports to Belarus, and Russian exporters at about 25% for exports to each of the two other countries. Available in Russian and English. http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/index.php?id_4=47864&linked_block_id=0

Report 31
Labour Migration and Labour-Intensive Industries in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: Possibilities for Human Development in Central Asia
Current research deals with the analysis of migration flow, labour potential in Central Asia (the examples of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are taken). The focus is made on the possibilities of both countries to reorient their economies from export of labour to export of labour-intensive goods and services. http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsCII/projects_Ci/index.php?id_4=48785&linked_block_id=0

Report 32
Monitoring of Mutual Investments in CIS Countries 2015
According to the sixth report of a years-long research project in 2014 the fall in mutual foreign direct investments (FDI) between the CIS countries was $6.3 billion, or 12% year-on-year. One of the main causes for this drastic decline in all mutual FDI in the CIS was the destabilised economic and political situation in Ukraine. At the same time, while overall investment activity in the CIS has shrunk, the young integration organization – the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – demonstrates stability. Even despite the devaluation of national currencies, mutual FDI in the EAEU region in 2014 grew from $24.8 billion to $25.1 billion. The positive dynamics in investment flows in the EAEU was largely due to the advancement and strengthening of regional economic integration. Available in Russian and English. http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/index.php?id_4=48979&linked_block_id=0

Report 33
EDB Integration Barometer — 2015
The fourth wave of public opinion surveys on integration preferences in the CIS countries suggests that the “integration core” of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) continues to consolidate. In Kazakhstan, Russia and the Kyrgyz Republic 78–86% of the population supports the Eurasian integration. At the same time, in Belarus and Armenia the rate of approval of Eurasian integration reduced in the recent year. These are the findings of The EDB Integration Barometer, a yearly research conducted by Eurasian Development Bank’s (EDB) Centre for Integration Studies. In 2015, over 11,000 people from nine CIS region countries — Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine — took part in the poll. The research has been conducted by the EDB Centre for Integration Studies since 2012 annually in partnership with “Eurasian Monitor”, an international research agency. Available in Russian and English. http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/index.php?id_4=48997&linked_block_id=0

Report 34
EAEU and Eurasia: Monitoring and Analyses of Direct Investments
The report presents new results of the permanent annual project dedicated to monitoring of direct investments in Eurasia. This report focuses on direct investments of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine in all countries of Eurasia outside the CIS and Georgia as well as reciprocal direct investments of Austria, Netherlands, Turkey, Iran, India, Vietnam, China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan in the seven CIS countries mentioned above. Available in Russian and English. http://eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/index.php?id_4=49144&linked_block_id=0

Report 35
Forecasting System for the Eurasian Economic Union
Joint Report by the Eurasian Economic Commission and the Eurasian Development Bank. This work builds upon the findings of the joint research undertaken by the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) and the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) to create a system capable of generating economic forecasts for EAEU member states, subject to any applicable country-specific social components. The project has yielded an Integrated System of Models covering five countries. It can be used to analyze economic processes, make projections, and develop proposals and guidance on streamlining economic policies within the EAEU. Available in Russian and English. http://eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/index.php?id_4=49199&linked_block_id=0
Report 36  
Liberalization of the Republic of Belarus Financial Market within the EAEU  
The development of the EAEU requires a coordinated foreign exchange policy, harmonised regulations governing the financial market, and the establishment of a common financial market to ensure the free movement of capital between the member states. The single financial market will produce significant economic effects such as increased investments in the common market, maximized returns, broader risk distribution, and lower borrowing costs, especially for smaller economies. 
Belarus will benefit from its movement towards a single financial market in the EAEU. However, this also creates certain challenges. These findings of Eurasian Development Bank’s (EDB) Centre for Integration Studies are presented in the report Liberalisation of the Republic of Belarus Financial Market within the EAEU. 
Available in Russian and English.  
http://eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/index.php?id_4=49260&linked_block_id=0

Report 37  
Regional Organizations: Typology and Development Paths  
The report presents the results of the EDB Centre for Integration Studies’ ongoing project “Regional Integration in the World.” One of the aims of this project is comprehensive analysis of regional integration organizations in the world and later application of the findings in facilitating the processes of Eurasian integration. The report Regional Organizations: Typology and Development Paths provides the key conclusions and recommendations which are based on a detailed review of sixty organizations.  
http://eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/index.php?id_4=49351&linked_block_id=0

Report 38  
European Union and Eurasian Economic Union: Long-Term Dialogue and Perspectives of Agreement  
The report presents preliminary results of conceptual analysis of developing EU-EAEU economic relations and search of practical approaches to achieving that goal. This work is processed by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA, Austria) and the Centre for Integration Studies of Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) within long-term ongoing joint project “Challenges and Opportunities of Economic Integration within a Wider European and Eurasian Space.”  
http://eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/index.php?id_4=49507&linked_block_id=0

Report 39  
Monitoring of Mutual Investments in CIS Countries 2016  
The report is the seventh in a series of publications presenting the findings of a permanent research project concerned with the monitoring of mutual investments in CIS countries and Georgia. The analysis is built on a database that has been maintained on the basis of diverse data obtained from publicly available sources. 
Available in Russian and English.  
http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/invest_monitoring/
Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) is an international financial organization established to promote economic growth in its member states, extend trade and economic ties between them and to support integration in Eurasia by implementing its investment projects. The Bank was conceived by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan and established in 2006. EDB member states include the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Russian Federation.

Facilitation of integration in Eurasia as well as information and analytical support thereof are among the most important goals of the Bank. In 2011 EDB Centre for Integration Studies was established. The key objectives of the Centre are as follows: organization of research, preparation of reports and recommendations to the governments of EDB member states on the matters of regional economic integration.

Over the last five years, EDB Centre for Integration Studies has proved itself as a leading analytical think-tank dealing with the issues of Eurasian integration. In partnership with the experts, research centers and institutions, the Centre has published 40 reports and prepared more than 50 insights and briefs for Presidential Executive Offices, Ministries of EDB member states, and the Eurasian Economic Commission.

More detailed information about EDB Centre for Integration Studies, its projects, publications, research fields, as well as electronic versions of its reports is available on the website of the Eurasian Development Bank at: http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/aboutCIS/index.php

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In April – June 2016, the Eurasian Development Bank’s Centre for Integration Studies together with its international research partner Eurasian Monitor conducted the fifth wave of measurements of the sentiment of the countries of the post-Soviet space as part of the EDB Integration Barometer project. This research is focused on the integration orientations of the citizens of countries of the CIS region. The fifth wave of the project includes nationwide surveys in seven countries of the CIS region: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and Tajikistan. In all, 8,500 people were surveyed (at least 1,000 people in each country, according to a representative national sampling).

Electronic version of the report is available on the Eurasian Development Bank’s website at: http://eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/integration_barometer/